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RETHINKING THE JURISDICTION OF BANKRUPTCY
COURTS OVER POST-CONFIRMATION FEDERAL TAx
LIABILITIES: TOWARDS A NEW JURISPRUDENCE OF 11

U.S.C. § 505
Shu-Yi Oei*

I. INTRODUCTION

The resolution of tax liabilities is a critical factor in bankruptcy
filings and successful resolution of bankruptcy cases in the United
States.' This suggests that the ability of bankruptcy courts to address
issues of tax liability is important to the success or failure of bankruptcy
reorganizations. The authority of bankruptcy courts to determine tax
liability is governed by § 505 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.
Section 505(a) states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court may
determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine or penalty
relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously
assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested before and
adjudicated 2 by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction.

In the plain text of § 505(a)(1), there is absolutely no reference to
the context in which this adjudicative authority is granted to the
* J.D., 2003, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank Assistant Professor Diane Ring of
Harvard Law School for comments on earlier drafts and Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard
Law School for her guidance and suggestions.
1. See Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of
Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 559 (1999) (finding that 20% of failed
businesses surveyed "specifically identify federal taxes as the source of their troubles and the reason
they ended up in the bankruptcy court").
2. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (2003). The exceptions to the general rule listed in § 505(a)(2) are:
(A) for taxes already contested and adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal, and (B)
limitations on the time period in which the court may determine the right of the estate to a tax
refund. § 505(a)(2).
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bankruptcy court. Indeed, the plain language of the statute does not even
mention the designation "bankruptcy court" at all. The context in which
the bankruptcy court's authority to make these determinations is granted
must be gleaned from references to the "trustee," the "debtor" and the
"estate" in § 505(a)(2) and (b).3
The breadth of the literal wording of § 505(a) has given rise to
difficulties in interpreting the reach of bankruptcy courts' authority to
determine tax liabilities. One leading treatise notes that the only real
restrictions on the reach of § 505 are that (1) the liability must not have
been adjudicated prior to the commencement of the Title 11 case, and
(2) the requirement that there be present an "actual case or
controversy."4 These limitations are not very substantial, nor do they
provide information about the types of tax liabilities bankruptcy courts
have authority to determine, or how long that authority persists. In the
face of the potentially tremendous reach of the statute, courts have noted
that "[t]aken at face value, without recourse to the legislative history, §
505 makes the Bankruptcy Courts a second tax court system,
empowering the Bankruptcy Court to consider 'any' tax whatsoever, on
whomsoever imposed." 5
The potentially unlimited jurisdiction that a literal reading of §
505(a) would allow suggests that such a reading is unfeasible. Indeed,
bankruptcy courts have not employed § 505(a) for an unlimited range of
purposes. Rather, they have attempted to circumscribe the authority
granted by the provision and to distinguish uncontroversial applications
of § 505 from applications that are more suspect. 6 One of the key issues
courts have faced has been the extent to which bankruptcy courts may
employ § 505 in determining tax liabilities that may arise after the
bankruptcy case has been discharged. In Chapter 11 reorganizations the focus of this paper - this discharge takes place at the time the plan of
reorganization is confirmed. 7 In deciding this question, bankruptcy
3. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2), (b).
4. 15 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY TX5.04[2] (Lawrence King, ed., 15th ed. rev. 2002).
5. In re Interstate Motor Freight System, 62 B.R. 805, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986);
quoted in Michigan Employment Security Commission v. Wolverine Radio Co. (In re Wolverine
Radio Co.), 930 F.2d 1132, 1139 (6th Cir. 1991).
6. For instance, several courts have held that § 505 does not confer jurisdiction on
bankruptcy courts to determine the tax liability of a party other than the debtor or the bankruptcy
estate. See, e.g., In re Brandt-Airflex Corp., 843 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1988); American Principals
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 904 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1990). But see Quattrone Accountants, Inc.
v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that § 505 clarifies rather than limits jurisdiction and is
hence wholly inapplicable to the question of bankruptcy court jurisdiction over non-debtor tax
liability).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 114(d)(l) (2003). However, if the Chapter II plan involves a liquidation of
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courts have for the most part looked to sources outside of § 505 to
determine the proper application of § 505, rather than engaging in
analysis of § 505 itself. Such sources include the "actual case or
controversy" requirement of the United States Constitution and the "core
proceedings" constraints contained in Title 28 of the United States
Code.8 This chosen approach of the bankruptcy courts may reflect
historical debates over the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts peculiar to
the United States and may also stem from considerations of bankruptcy
and tax policy.9
Although it is possible that looking to sources outside of § 505
rather than rigidly circumscribing § 505 itself may lead to increased
flexibility in employing this provision; bankruptcy court analyses of the
constitutional requirements, jurisdictional provisions, and their
relationship to § 505 have also been confusing and inconsistent. The
analysis of whether there is an actual case or controversy or whether a
given matter is a "core proceeding" necessitates an individualized
analysis of the circumstances of every case. Furthermore, the use of
such an approach requires positing a complex underlying theory of the
relationship between § 505 with the surrounding jurisdictional and
constitutional constraints that limit it. Courts thus far have not given
adequate consideration to such theoretical underpinnings, thus
contributing to the inconsistency.
This paper argues that the current approach that bankruptcy courts
have taken in circumscribing the reach of § 505 over liabilities that may
arise after the plan has been confirmed and discharged is unsatisfactory.
Instead of turning to jurisdictional and constitutional sources external to
§ 505, the reach of § 505(a) should be determined through imposing a
bright line limitation internal to § 505 itself. It is the contention of this
paper that based on the location of § 505 in the Bankruptcy Code, the
overall structure of the Code, and the legislative history of the provision,
the authority contained in § 505 should be limited to determinations of
pre-petition and post-petition-pre-confirmation tax matters, designations
that will be elaborated later. Such an approach simplifies and clarifies
the relationship of § 505 to the statutory and constitutional provisions

all or substantially all the property of the estate and a cessation of business operations, then
confirmation of the plan does not discharge the debtor. § 1141(d)(3). Such liquidating Chapter lIs
are not the focus of this paper.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2003).
9.

See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF

DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 933-77 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the history of federal bankruptcy court
jurisdiction).
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surrounding it and takes some of the burden of circumscribing
jurisdiction off of these provisions. It is also consistent with the overall
structure of the United States Bankruptcy Code and bankruptcy system
as a whole. In addition, this approach should not significantly
compromise important bankruptcy policy goals inherent in the
bankruptcy system.
Part II of this paper delineates the categories of tax issues that are
under consideration and briefly describes how they have been treated in
bankruptcy court analyses. Part III examines the issues at stake in the
decision regarding how to limit § 505. Formulating a clear answer to
this question will illuminate the policy consequences of the model
proposed in this paper. Part IV summarizes the ways in which
bankruptcy courts currently employ constitutional and statutory
limitations external to § 505 in addressing questions pertaining to their
jurisdiction over tax matters in a variety of cases and points out
inconsistencies and irregularities in these analyses. It also explores the
policy rationales for this type of approach to limiting § 505. Part V
proposes a reading of § 505 that suggests a principle internal to that
provision that limits its reach. It argues that in the light of the overall
structure of the Bankruptcy Code and the legislative history of § 505, §
505 is most appropriately applied only to tax liabilities that arise for time
periods prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and during the
administration of the estate, or "gap." Finally, Part VI considers the
policy implications of the proposed approach to understanding § 505 and
argues that, despite the increased simplicity gained using this model,
there are few significant adverse public policy consequences that are
implicated.
II. THE UNIVERSE OF TAX MATTERS UNDER CONSIDERATION

A central feature of the United States bankruptcy system lies in the
clear distinction it draws between liabilities arising before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case - that is, the date of filing of the
bankruptcy petition - those arising during the period of administration of
the estate, and those arising after the case has been discharged.' 0 These
clear lines are maintained throughout the treatment of claims in
bankruptcy. Generally, claims that arise before the filing of the petition
10. The liabilities arising during the period of estate administration (that is, between the filing
of the bankruptcy petition and the discharge of the case) may be referred to as "gap" liabilities,
because they arise in the gap between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the confirmation of
the plan of reorganization in reorganization bankruptcies.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol19/iss1/3

4

Oei: Rethinking the Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts Over Post-Confir

2004]

RETHINKING JURISDICTION

and during the period of administration of the bankruptcy estate are paid
out of the property of the estate and are resolved in the bankruptcy while
those arising after the confirmation of the plan are beyond the reach of
the bankruptcy proceeding. 1
The analyses of commentators on the authority of bankruptcy
courts to determine tax liabilities under § 505 have recognized this
division of liabilities into those arising in the pre-petition time period,
the post-petition-pre-confirmation time period (commonly referred to as
the "gap" or estate administration period) and the post-confirmation time2
period that is a fundamental feature of bankruptcy law as a whole.'
Generally speaking, the authority of bankruptcy court to determine under
§ 505(a) the tax liabilities of the debtor that arose before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition is not in question, and bankruptcy court authority to
determine "gap" tax liabilities is also quite clear. 13 However, the
treatment of tax liabilities arising after the confirmation of the plan of
reorganization have been less univocal. 14 It is clear that § 505 does not
allow bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over post-confirmation taxes that
are totally unrelated to the bankruptcy - for instance, taxes owed by the
reorganized debtor for tax years after the bankruptcy. 15 However, the
treatment of other types of post-confirmation tax liabilities in bankruptcy
is less clear. Most significantly, courts have split over whether a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to determine the tax consequences of a
plan of reorganization. 16
Although the delineation of these three timeframes - pre-petition,
"gap," and post-confirmation - is a bright line, it is often difficult to
11. See II U.S.C. § 10 1(5) (2003) (defining "claim"); §§ 501-502 (2003) (describing the
filing of proofs of claims and the claims resolution process); § 503 (2003) (pertaining to treatment
of administrative expenses in the "gap"); § 541 (2000) (defining "property of the estate"); §
1141(d)(1)(A) (2003) (limiting discharge to debts arising before the date of confirmation).
12. See, e.g., Jack F. Williams, National Bankruptcy Review Commission Tax
Recommendations: Notice, Jurisdiction, and Corporate Debtors, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 261, 268-80
(1998).
13. See id. at 270-74.
14. See id at 274 (stating that post-confirmation tax liability "presents some of the most
important and problematic jurisdictional issues in all of bankruptcy" and features "a violent clash
between bankruptcy and tax policies").
15. See GORDON D. HENDERSON & STUART J. GOLDRING, TAX PLANNING FOR TROUBLED
CORPORATIONS § 1013, at 609-10 (2004) (citing In re Callan, Bankr. D. Ala. (Mar. 13, 1992),
reprintedat 92 TNT 84-85).
16. See, e.g., In re Goldblatt, 106 BR. 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (concluding that a
bankruptcy court could determine responsibility for tax on interest earned on money in Creditors'
Deposit Account created under the plan of reorganization). But see In re Antonelli, 1992 WL
435879 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992) (holding that a bankruptcy court could not declare whether parties
were exempt from stamp tax on transfers of property to and by a trust created under the plan).
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determine whether a particular liability falls into a particular category.
This can in part be attributed to the potentially limitless range of fact
situations that may arise in a bankruptcy case. The confusion associated
with making such classifications has resulted in inaccurate analyses of
the issues. Such inaccuracies must be apprehended and corrected before
a cogent internal theory of the application of § 505 may be developed.
Furthermore, a clear understanding of the content of this timeframebased classification is fundamental to understanding the basics of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction and power over both tax and non-tax
matters.
Therefore, in the interests of analytical precision, it is
appropriate at this point to revisit the classification of tax matters into
pre-petition, "gap," and post-confirmation liabilities.
A. Pre-PetitionTax Liabilities
The most clear-cut example of a pre-petition tax liability is a
liability that arises for a tax year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. For example, if the bankruptcy petition is filed in 2003, tax
liabilities for the 2002 tax year will be considered pre-petition taxes,
regardless of whether the liability has been assessed at the time the
bankruptcy petition is filed. 17 However, not all cases involving prepetition tax liabilities are so clear-cut. For instance, there is the question
of how to treat a tax refund that is not determined to exist until after the
bankruptcy petition has been filed. In regard to refunds, taxpayers may
attempt to argue that overpayment and refund issues that come before
the court after the bankruptcy petition has been filed are post-petition tax
determinations that may not be set off against the IRS's pre-petition
claim.' 8 However, refunds have generally been held to accrue as of the
end of the taxable year, regardless of whether the tax refund is
determinable by the time of filing of the bankruptcy petition, since it is
the timing of accrual of the refund that determines whether it is prepetition or post-petition. 19 Hence, tax refunds that accrue in a pre17.

E.g., United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932, 934 (Bankr. D.C. Kan. 1984) (holding that

in bankruptcy, for purposes of determining when a tax was incurred, the date of accrual, not the date
of assessment, controls) (citing In re Scrap Disposal, Inc., 24 B.R. 178, 180 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)
(holding that tax due on corrected assessment after bankruptcy filing but that related back to prepetition period was incurred pre-petition and not entitled to administrative expense priority)).
18. See, e.g., In re Harbaugh, 99 B.R. 671 (Bankr. W.D.Pa. 1989), rev'dHarbaugh v. United
States, 1989 WL 139254 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd902 F.2d 1560 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that a tax
refund that accrued in a year prior to bankruptcy is a pre-petition claim, even though assessed postpetition); In re Wilson 29 B.R. 54 (Bankr. W.D. Ark 1982).
19. See, e.g., In re Rozel, Inc., 120 B.R. 944 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1990) (concluding that the right
to refund for pre-petition tax year arises pre-petition, even if not claimed till after the petition and
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bankruptcy tax year are considered pre-petition liabilities, even if the
refunds are not determined until after the petition has been filed.
Similarly, after a claim has been filed against the estate of the
debtor, either the taxing authority or the debtor may, provided such
proceeding is not already pending in Tax Court, request under § 505 that
the Bankruptcy Court determine the individual tax liability of the debtor
for taxes that are not dischargeable in the bankruptcy, in addition to
determining the validity of claims against the estate. 20 Even though such
taxes are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, they are valid pre-petition
claims, since the liabilities themselves arose before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Commentaries on § 505 are quite clear that
bankruptcy courts may hear these liabilities under § 505.
The question of determining responsible person liability under
I.R.C. § 6672 is another problematic area. Responsible personal
penalties are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 2' Hence, in some cases,
the IRS purposely does not file a claim for such penalties in the
bankruptcy, preferring instead to go after the debtor after the bankruptcy
case has been discharged. 22 Some may argue that this liability is a postpetition matter if it is ultimately resolved outside the bankruptcy
proceeding. However, courts have held that such responsible person
since the behavior that gave rise to
liability is a pre-petition obligation,
23
the penalty occurred pre-petition.
B. Tax Liabilitiesof the Estate During the "Gap"
Tax liabilities arising after the filing of the bankruptcy petition but
return claiming it is not due till after the petition date); In re Ferguson, 83 B.R. 676 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1988) (noting that a tax refund arose at the end of the taxable year); In re Conti, 50 B.R. 142
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (concluding that a refund related to 1982 tax year, though unclaimed and
unpaid until after the bankruptcy petition in 1984, accrued at the end of the 1982 tax year and was
still a pre-petition asset subject to setoff).
20. See II U.S.C.A. § 505 (West 2003) (Legislative Statements).
21. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(7) (2003), 1141(d) (2003). See also In re Garrett, 1991 WL
101549 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that I.R.C. § 6672 responsible person liability is a tax and
not a penalty under the Bankruptcy Code and hence is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(7)) (citing
George v. California State Board of Equalization (In re George), 95 B.R. 718 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1989)); Matlock v. United States (In re Matlock), 104 B.R. 389 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989); In re
Clate, 69 B.R. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); Clark v. United States (In re Clark), 64 B.R. 437
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Hatchett, 31 B.R. 833, 835 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983)).
22. See, e.g., Kilen v. United States (In re Kilen), 129 B.R. 538 (Bankr. N.D. Il.1991); In re
Huddleston, 994 WL 764193 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1994).
23. See, e.g., IRS v. Lee, 184 B.R. 257 (W.D. Va. 1995) (holding that debtors' responsible
person liability to IRS for corporation's pre-petition failure to remit withholding taxes was prepetition debt, even if IRS did not learn of liability till after petition); In re Friesenhahn, 169 B.R.
615 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
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before the confirmation of the plan of reorganization also receive
different treatment than pre-petition and post-confirmation tax liabilities.
As is the case with other liabilities incurred by the estate during the
period of estate administration, these are treated as administrative
expenses, except to the extent that they are priority taxes.24 These
administrative expenses will generally be paid off ahead of most other
priority claims in the bankruptcy, as well as ahead of the general
unsecured creditors.
"Gap" tax liabilities are distinguished from pre-petition tax
liabilities because they are not "claims" of creditors of the prebankruptcy debtor that arose prior to the bankruptcy, but rather are
liabilities of the entity created at the time of the bankruptcy filing - the
estate. In the case of determinations of tax liability, the ability of
bankruptcy courts to hear "gap" tax liabilities is squarely addressed in §
505(b), which provides a procedure that trustees in bankruptcy or
debtors in possession can use to obtain a determination by taxing
authorities of the amount of taxes owed by the estate for the
administration period.26 Such a determination is important because the
amount of administrative expense taxes owed will impact the payout
available to other (general unsecured) creditors in the bankruptcy.
C. Post-ConfirmationTax Liabilities
The designation "post-confirmation tax matter" in the bankruptcy
claims context, and as used in this paper, is properly applied to liabilities
arising post-confirmation. As discussed above, the clear delineation of
claims in bankruptcy is squarely based on the time period over which the
tax accrued and in which the liability arose, rather than on the moment at
which the issue is before the bankruptcy court. For example, a liability
that arose for a tax year prior to confirmation is still a pre-confirmation
claim, even if- for whatever reason - the issue does not come before the
court until after the plan of reorganization has been confirmed.27
Under the general categorization of post-confirmation tax liabilities,
some liabilities are clearly outside the reach of the bankruptcy court,
while the treatment of others is less clear. Perhaps the most debated type
of post-confirmation liabilities is the category of post-confirmation tax
24. II U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B) (2003); II U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (2003). These § 507(a)(8)
priority taxes are paid off after the § 503(b) administrative expenses in the order specified under §
507(a). 11 U.S.C. § 507(a).
25. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2003).
26. See II U.S.C. § 505(b) (2003).
27. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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consequences of plans of reorganization.2 8 The reason for this is
twofold. First, obtaining a determination of the tax consequences of a
plan of reorganization before the plan is confirmed may be vital to the
success or failure of the plan. The interest in confirming a plan of
reorganization that has a good chance of success has led to discussions
of whether and how § 505 may be interpreted to allow bankruptcy courts
to declare the tax consequences of such plans. Second, the debate over
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to adjudicate post-confirmation federal tax
matters under § 505(a) takes place against the backdrop of the enactment
and subsequent reduction in scope of § 1146(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code.29 In effect, subject to certain procedural requirements, this section
allows the bankruptcy court to declare the state and local tax
consequences of Chapter 11 plans of reorganization. 30 Although the
House bill had initially included the power to declare federal tax
consequences in § 1146(d), the reference to federal taxes was later
removed in the Senate amendment. 3' In light of what might have been if
the final statute had included federal taxes, much of the debate has
centered around whether or not bankruptcy courts may declare the
federal tax consequences of Chapter 11 plans, in addition to state and
local tax consequences, and if so, where such authorization lies.32
Although determinations of federal tax consequences of Chapter 11

28. See Williams, supra note 12, at 274-76; see also Donald D. Haber, The Declaratory
Powers of Bankruptcy Courts to Determine the Federal Tax Consequences of Chapter 11 Plans, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407 (1995); Robert A. Jacobs, The Bankruptcy Court's Emergence as
Tax Dispute Arbiter of Choice, 45 TAx LAW. 971, 992 (1992).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1146(d) (2003).
The court may authorize the proponent of a plan to request a determination, limited to
questions of law, by a State or local governmental unit charged with responsibility for
collection or determination of a tax on or measured by income, of the tax effects, under
section 346 of this title and under the law imposing such tax, of the plan. In the event of
an actual controversy, the court may declare such effects after the earlier of(1) the date
on which such governmental unit responds to the request under this subsection; or (2)
270 days after such request
Id. (emphasis added).
30. See id.
31. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I1146.LH[2] (Lawrence King, ed., 15th ed. rev. 2003). The
legislative history reflects that federal tax consequences were excluded from the statutory language
just before enactment to facilitate smooth passage through Congress, with the intention of
addressing the federal rules in the next Congress, an eventuality that has not come to pass. Id. See
also Haber, supra note 28, at 423.
32. See, e.g., Haber, supra note 28, at 425 ("[B]ecause the impact of federal income tax issues
can have a dramatic effect on the ability to confirm an Chapter II plan, the question becomes: Does
the lack of reference to federal taxes in section 1146(d) present an insurmountable obstacle to a
bankruptcy court declaring the federal income tax effects of a Chapter II reorganization plan under
section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code?").
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plans are an important post-confirmation issue, this type of question
does not exhaust the universe of post-confirmation tax issues that must
be considered. Indeed, framing the issue in terms of tax consequences of
reorganization plans alone may be conceptually misleading, because
such a categorization emphasizes impact-based considerations rather
than highlighting the analytically precise categories based on time period
that are so fundamental to bankruptcy law in general. Post-confirmation
tax issues may or may not be related to the reorganization plan or even
to the bankruptcy. For instance, courts may be requested to determine
the tax liabilities of the reorganized debtor for tax years after the
bankruptcy petition, on the theory that the extent of tax liability will
impact the success of the plan.33 A request of this type will usually not
fall within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.34
In some cases, it may be difficult to separate genuine postconfirmation tax matters that actually arise post-confirmation from tax
matters that come before the court after confirmation but are actually not
post-confirmation matters. When bankruptcy courts have been called on
(after confirmation) to determine whether tax refunds that are for prepetition taxes but become due to debtors after confirmation can be setoff
against pre-petition debt are an example. 35 As noted above, such issues
are actually pre-petition tax issues. 36 To take a more ambiguous
example, the debtor in one case made a pre-confirmation request that the
bankruptcy court determine that he had no state or federal responsible
person liability to the IRS. This determination would occur after
confirmation, and there were as yet no claims or assessments of such
personal liability
liability by the IRS.3 7 As has been noted, responsible
38
liability.
pre-petition
a
considered
is also properly
III. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INTERPRETING

§ 505's

APPLICABILITY TO POST-CONFIRMATION TAx MATTERS

An understanding of the delineation of tax matters into pre-petition,
post-petition-pre-confirmation, and post-confirmation tax liabilities
33. See HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 15, at 610 (citing In re Callahan Bankr. D. Ala.
(Mar. 13, 1992); In re Holly's, Inc., 172 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994)).
34. See id.
35. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. See also In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 239
B.R. 741 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (discussed infra p. 29).
36. But see In re Gordon Sel-Way, 239 B.R. 741 (holding that overpayments arose after
confirmation, even though it was for pre-petition tax year, because the tax was not paid till after
confirmation).
37. See In re Schwartz, 192 B.R. 90 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996).
38. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes 22-24.
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enables determination of exactly what is at stake in the question of the
scope of jurisdiction over post-confirmation tax matters available under
Bankruptcy Code § 505. As a preliminary matter, one notes that Title 11
contains broad provisions under which bankruptcy courts may attempt to
assert jurisdiction over certain matters. Among these are 11 U.S.C. §
105, which provides that the bankruptcy court "may issue any order,
process, or judgment necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this title," and 11 U.S.C. § 1142, which provides that "the court may
direct the debtor and any other necessary party to... perform any
act... that is necessary for the consummation of the plan., 39 The
question therefore arises as to why these provisions cannot be applied to
allow courts to determine post-confirmation tax claims. The answer lies
in the existence and terms of the Declaratory Judgment Act. 40 The Act
provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with
respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a proceeding under section 505
or 1146 of title 11, or in any civil action involving an antidumping or
countervailing duty proceeding regarding a class or kind of
merchandise of a free trade area country (as defined in section
516A(f)(10) of the Tariff Act of 1930), as determined by the
administering authority, any court of the United States, upon the filing
of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall
have the force and4 effect
of a final judgment or decree and shall be
1
reviewable as such.
In other words, since § 505 and § 1146 are the only two Bankruptcy
Code exceptions to the prohibition of declaratory judgments with respect
to federal taxes in the Act, and since most determinations of postconfirmation tax liabilities will necessarily be declaratory judgments,
bankruptcy courts must find that a federal tax matter falls under § 505 or
§ 1146 in order to issue such judgment. Section 1146 does not provide
for the declaration of federal tax consequences of Chapter 11 plans.4 2
Hence, it follows that bankruptcy courts must rely on § 505 in making
these determinations. If § 505 is determined - by virtue of its location
and legislative history - to apply only to pre-petition claims, then
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1142 (2003).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2003).
41. Id.(emphasis added).
42. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy courts will be unable to render declaratory judgments to
determine post-confirmation federal taxes at all. Absent the constraints
of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the bankruptcy court might be able to
determine some post-confirmation tax issues by applying other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, subject to the general jurisdictional
provisions of Title 28. However, the presence of the general prohibition
against declaratory judgments of federal tax liabilities in the Act, outside
of § 505 and § 1146, means that these other provisions may not be
utilized to determine such tax liabilities.
This eventuality raises serious policy concerns about the impact of
a narrow reading of § 505. If § 505 is interpreted to only authorize
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to decide pre-petition and "gap" claims,
and not post-confirmation claims, then courts will have no statutory
authorization to determine post-confirmation tax claims. This may lead
to detrimental results in cases where future tax liabilities cannot be
determined with certainty but where these tax liabilities may adversely
affect the success or failure of the bankruptcy reorganization. For
example, as several commentators have pointed out, the ability of
debtors to obtain declaratory judgments regarding the tax consequences
of Chapter 11 plans of reorganization can be critical in determining the
success or failure of the reorganization.4 3 Hence, the outcome of how
the jurisdictional reach of § 505 is interpreted may implicate the degree
to which the broader goals of bankruptcy reorganization are helped or
hindered and, correspondingly, the degree to which goals of tax policy
are helped or hindered. The following subsections address some of the
important bankruptcy and tax policy goals that may be affected.
A. The Interest in Asserting Sufficient JurisdictionalReach Such That
Important Goals in Bankruptcy Policy are Met
Perhaps the two most traditional objectives of the liquidation
bankruptcy process in general are: (1) achieving an equitable and
centralized distribution of the debtor's assets in bankruptcy; and (2)
providing the debtor with the benefits of a "fresh start. '4 4 These two
goals are of primary importance, at least in the context of liquidation
bankruptcies. In terms of reorganization bankruptcies - cases under

43. See, e.g., Haber, supra note 28; Jacobs, supra note 28; Williams, supra note 12, at 279-80
(arguing that preventing a bankruptcy court from determining tax consequences of a plan of
reorganization may force the court to deny confirmation due to lack of feasibility of the plan, if
feasibility turns on these tax consequences).
44. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 9, at 177.
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Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code - a slightly modified
policy is at work. In reorganization cases, the concern is with successful
rehabilitation of the debtor - a fresh start of sorts, but with the debtor
continuing as a going concern. This is achieved by centralizing and
rewriting all pre-petition liabilities in the form of a plan of
reorganization. 45 The interest in debtor rehabilitation is particularly
acute in Chapter 11 business cases because a Chapter 7 discharge is not
available for entities that are not individuals.4 6 Hence, in the absence of
discharge in business cases, there is no fresh start available for a debtor
corporation in liquidation. In effect, this is a guarantee of corporate
demise.47
Against the backdrop of these broad bankruptcy policies lie the
specific policy concerns embedded in § 505. The authority granted by
the statute, at least with regard to determinations of pre-petition tax
liabilities - reflects congressional concern with protecting creditors from
dissipation of assets of the debtor's estate, which might occur if the
debtors, while in desperate financial situation, failed to contest a tax
assessment. 48 At the same time, it also ensures finality of tax liability
determinations that were reached prior to the bankruptcy by prohibiting
bankruptcy court redeterminations of tax liabilities that have already
been contested and determined by administrative or judicial tribunals.4 9
In addition to the policy goals behind § 505 that appear concerned
with protecting creditors in general from asset dissipation and the IRS in
particular from having previous determinations set aside, the broader
goals of the federal bankruptcy process - such as equitable distributions,
administrability and rehabilitation of the debtor through maximum
efficiency and centralization - also come into play in the determination
of the reach of § 505 over post-confirmation tax matters.
1. The Importance of Rehabilitation of the Debtor and the Fresh
Start
The concern with debtor rehabilitation is an important reason in

45. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C § 1129 (2003) (listing requirements for confirmation of plan); § 1141
(2000) (describing the effects of confirmation of the plan).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2003).
47. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 9, at 499 (stating that "[l]iquidation is, as the
term suggests, death").
48. E.g., In re Galvano, 116 B.R. 367, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing In re Northwest
Beverage, Inc., 46 B.R. 631 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) and In re Fiedel Country Day School, 55 B.R.
229, 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
49. Id. at 372-73.
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favor of applying § 505(a) to post-confirmation tax issues. Tax issues
arising after plan confirmation - whether as consequences of the plan of
reorganization or otherwise - can have a substantial impact on whether
the plan of reorganization succeeds. 50 For instance, with regard to plans
of reorganization, it may be important for a debtor to know the tax
consequences of a proposed plan of reorganization before confirmation.
This is because unexpected adverse tax consequences may jeopardize
the debtor's chances of successfully making payments to creditors under
the plan. While it is possible for debtors to ascertain tax consequences
of the plan by obtaining an advance ruling from the IRS, this may be
time-consuming and value-diminishing in the bankruptcy context due to
time value of money concerns.51 As one author notes:
Chapter 11 debtors need to have the ability to reorganize in an efficient
and orderly manner. Because successful corporate restructuring in
bankruptcy often depends upon the favorable tax consequences of that
restructuring, there should be a uniform method for Chapter 11 debtors
to obtain binding 52rulings regarding the tax effects of their
reorganization plans.
It is equally important that debtors have a way of determining
potential negative tax consequences of proposed plans of reorganization
so as to avert them in a timely manner.
Tax consequences of the reorganization plan aside, other types of
post-confirmation tax issues may have no less impact on the success of a
plan of reorganization. The amount of other taxes that the debtor is
assessed as liable for during periods after a plan has been confirmed will
affect the amount of money available to make payments to other
creditors under the plan.
In the interest of assuring success of
reorganization plans - and thereby the rehabilitation of the debtor - a
strident proponent of a broad reading of § 505 may argue that
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over post-confirmation tax issues is
appropriate, at least as far as those liabilities affect plan success, and
50.

See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 28, at 1014 (stating "as some of the recent cases ...

demonstrate, the plans of reorganization and the substantive rights of the creditors and, in some
cases, stockholders, depend upon the resolution of tax issues arguable not considered 'ripe' for
resolution outside of bankruptcy").

51. Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 I.R.B. 1,§ 8.02(4). The IRS processes requests for letter
rulings and determination letters in the order that they are received and will only grant expeditious
handling to requests when "a factor outside a taxpayer's control creates a real business need to
obtain a letter ruling or determination letter before a certain time in order to avoid serious business
consequences." Id. Even in such cases, the Service will not assure that the request will be
processed by the time requested. Id.
52. Haber, supra note 28, at 438.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol19/iss1/3

14

Oei: Rethinking the Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts Over Post-Confir

2004]

RETHINKING JURISDICTION

even at the risk of opening the door to perpetual bankruptcy court
jurisdiction.
2. Administrative Considerations
Another common argument for bankruptcy jurisdiction over postconfirmation tax issues is that the bankruptcy court is most familiar with
the affairs of the ex-debtor and the bankruptcy case in general, and
hence is the most suitable court to hear the case.53 A related concern is
that requiring the ex-debtor to go to another forum to have an issue
determined that has an impact on the bankruptcy plan's success is not in
the interest of judicial economy and may slow down the process of plan
confirmation.
These administrative concerns become especially crucial when it
comes to post-confirmation tax issues. Unlike pre-petition tax liabilities,
it is difficult for the debtor and the IRS to have these issues resolved as
part of the claims resolution process of the bankruptcy proceeding under
§§ 501 and 502. 54 In these contexts, § 505(a) read broadly may be a
valuable tool for the debtor in assembling all potential post-confirmation
payouts and liabilities such that a more feasible plan is proposed and
confirmed.
One should also note that for plans of reorganization, § 1 129(a)(1 1)
requires the bankruptcy court to determine the feasibility of such plan as
part of the plan confirmation process. 55 The feasibility determination
requires consideration of a number of factors, including consideration of
56
federal tax matters. Arguably, a statement of federal tax consequences
of the plan of reorganization and their impact on financial projections
53. See, e.g., Haber, supra note 28, at 435; HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supranote 15, at 568.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) allows a creditor to file a proof of claim. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2003).
If the creditor does not file a proof of his claim, the statute allows the debtor or trustee to file such a
proof of claim, hence preventing the escape of such claims from the bankruptcy net (a concern
especially if the claim is excepted from bankruptcy discharge under § 523). 11 U.S.C. § 501(c). In
cases where there is an objection to a claim, the bankruptcy court, after notice and a hearing, will
determine the allowed amount of such claim. II U.S.C. § 502(b) (2003).
55. 11 U.S.C. § I 129(a)(1 1) (2003) (stating that a requirement for a court to confirm a plan is
that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such
liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan").
56. E.g., In re Future Energy Corp., 83 B.R. 470, 503 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (reasoning that
feasibility determination should include consideration of "any ... related matter which determines
the prospects of a sufficiently successful operation to enable performance of the provisions of the
plan"); see also In re Prudential Energy Co., 58 B.R. 857, 864 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986) (noting that
feasibility requirement is not met where, among other things, debtor's revenue projections failed to
take into account effects of prospective tax revision legislation).
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should be made available both to the court and to the creditors in the
disclosure statement.57 However, the feasibility determination is clearly
not binding as to the actual amount of tax that will eventually be
assessed, as demonstrated by the fact that plans of reorganization do
fail.58 In cases where the federal tax consequences of the plan may not
be certain, allowing a § 505(a) determination by the bankruptcy court
would facilitate a more accurate and binding determination of the tax
consequences of the plan.
3. The Interest in Centrality and Equity
Another facet of the notion that the bankruptcy court is the most
appropriate forum to decide post-confirmation tax issues is the interest in
achieving the centralized and equitable distribution discussed above. It
is clear that in the bankruptcy context, where the size of the pie is
limited, questions and consequences of distribution are not to be
avoided. Arguably, the ex ante knowledge that there are undoubtedly
insufficient assets to go around makes the bankruptcy context unique. In
such a situation, the bankruptcy court and Code serve an important
function. Whereas the debtor and each individual creditor are acting and
planning in their own self interest, albeit - particularly in the
reorganization context - with an eye on keeping the debtor afloat in
order to assure its ultimate viability as a going concern, the bankruptcy
court is charged with balancing the varied and conflicting interests of all
of the various parties.
Thus, for example, in deciding the allowed amount of a claim under
§ 502(b), the bankruptcy court is necessarily sentient that its decision
impacts not only the claimant and the debtor, but also has unavoidable
impact on various third-parties. Allowing a larger claim amount to a
secured creditor will directly reduce the amounts available to satisfy the
general unsecured creditors. That the interests of third-parties are
inextricably connected to the resolution of disputes between any two
parties renders the determination of such disputes in the bankruptcy

57. See I I U.S.C. § 1125 (2003).
58. See, e.g., Nancy Rhein Baldiga, Is this Plan Feasible? An Empirical Legal Analysis of
Plan Feasibility, 101 COM. L.J. 115 (1996) (noting that no more than 44% of Chapter I I plans
challenged for feasibility were successfully consummated); Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed
Chapter 11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study andAnalysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297
(1992) (reporting that 10% of studied plans were consummated). See also Gerald F. Munitz,
Chapter 22: Feasibility and Recidivism, 820 PLI/CoMM 763 (2001) (arguing that a stricter
feasibility standard would significantly reduce the incidence of debtors re-filing under Chapter I l
after the failure of their first Chapter 1I plans).
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context different that in other contexts. Bankruptcy courts, by virtue of
their position, are in the ideal position to resolve such disputes, while
keeping the interests of all parties in the bankruptcy in view.59
Hence, for the above reasons, bankruptcy courts are often touted as
the best forum for the resolution of post-confirmation tax issues.
Conversely, the bankruptcy court's ability to function as such a central
arbiter is easily compromised if the tax creditor is allowed to hold the
debtor hostage by denying or stalling on an advance ruling, even though
the tax events are quite certain. If the application of § 505 is limited to
pre-confirmation claims, we stand to lose these valuable policy gains.
B. The Interest in Ensuringthat Federal Tax Policies are Not Thwarted
On the other side of the debate lie several important federal tax
policies. Those in favor of a constrained reading of § 505 often point to
these tax policies to support their viewpoint. The importance of both the
federal tax and bankruptcy systems is reflected in the inclusion of both
the congressional power to tax and the power to establish uniform
bankruptcy laws in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.6 ° Problematically,
the inclusion of both these federal institutions in Article I results in the
virtual impossibility of declaring one federal policy to be more important
than the other. The sometimes-conflicting nature of these two important
federal policies is especially clear in regards to determinations of postconfirmation tax liabilities. Indeed, one commentator has written that
the question of post confirmation tax liability "presents some of the most
important and problematic jurisdictional issues in all of bankruptcy," and
is the scene of "a violent clash between bankruptcy and tax policies. 6 1
In light of these conflicting policies, it is important to maintain balance
such that the interests of the taxing authority are given adequate
consideration by the bankruptcy system.
1. Equity and the Avoidance of Forum Shopping
Not surprisingly, the policy considerations from the IRS's
standpoint are very different from those considered important in
bankruptcy policy. Nowhere is this more clear than in regard to the
matter of achieving equity. As shown above, the bankruptcy viewpoint
59. Indeed, perhaps it is because bankruptcy courts have to resolve distributions in bankruptcy
fairly and equitably through a collective process, while keeping in mind the interests of all parties,
that various parties perceive them as either pro-debtor or anti-creditor.
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1,4.
61. Williams, supra note 12, at 274.
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focuses on achieving an equitable distribution among creditors of the
estate through a centralized resolution of claims.62 From the tax policy
perspective, the interest in equity cuts in the opposite direction. Since
bankruptcy courts are widely perceived as pro-debtor, it follows that a
person of this persuasion may expect any determination by the
bankruptcy court to favor the debtor over the taxing authority. 63 From
this perspective, allowing the bankruptcy courts to determine postconfirmation tax liabilities in effect gives the bankrupt debtor access to
another adjudicative forum that is unavailable to other taxpayers; an
effect that will encourage forum shopping through the filing of a
bankruptcy petition. Hence, equitable treatment of taxpayers is seen as
best achieved by having the post-confirmation tax liabilities of the postbankruptcy entity determined by the same courts and on the same
timeline as for other taxpayers who are not in bankruptcy.
2. The Interest in Revenue Collection
A corollary of the notion that bankruptcy courts are pro-debtor is
the fear that an expansive reading of § 505 will adversely impact the
revenue collection goals of the taxing authority. Indeed, the Bankruptcy
Code recognizes the importance of revenue collection even in the face of
the fresh-start policy in provisions that make certain taxes nondischargeable. 64 The concern is that allowing § 505 to extend broadly to
cover post-confirmation tax liabilities - which, arguably, are unrelated to
the bankruptcy - will further diminish the ability of the taxing authority
to collect revenue by allowing the bankruptcy court to dictate the
amounts owed to it.
Hence, the point of view of tax policy takes a very different
approach to the utility and fairness of the bankruptcy system, while
prizing other policy considerations. The IRS website announces clearly
that bankruptcy should not be a way for a debtor to solve all her
problems and obtain a fresh start.65 The policy implications for the
62. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (2003).
63. See, e.g., Thomas L. Ambro & Mark D. Collins, Why Delaware? (adapted from
DELAWARE LAWYER (Sept. 1997)), available at http://www.state.de.us/corp/bankrupt.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2003) (stating that "[tihe perception that bankruptcy judges generally are 'pro
debtor' pervades the entire American bankruptcy system").
64. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2003) (exempting certain priority taxes from discharge).
65. See Internal Revenue Service, Closing a Business - Declaring Bankruptcy, DIGITAL
DAILY, available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98701,00.html

(last visited

Apr. 25, 2003) ("Bankruptcy is not a quick cure for wiping your credit slate clean and giving you a
fresh start. Alimony, child support, and most taxes survive bankruptcy and will still be owed.
Declaring bankruptcy is a last resort to solving financial problems.").
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taxing authority must be balanced with other bankruptcy policies in the
analysis.
C. The Interest in Maintainingthe Internal Consistency and
Realizability of the Bankruptcy System As A Whole
In addition to important bankruptcy and tax policies at stake in our
determination of how § 505 should be read lies the consistent workings
and fundamental structure of the United States bankruptcy system as a
whole. As indicated above, a key feature of the bankruptcy system is the
clear delineation of liabilities into the pre-petition, post-petition-preconfirmation, and post-confirmation time periods.66 Of concern in the
determination of the scope of § 505 is the question of how such a
determination impacts this delineation. For example, if other postconfirmation claims were not determinable by the bankruptcy court in
the bankruptcy proceeding, it would be anomalous if post-confirmation
tax claims were deemed determinable. Furthermore, even if one were to
argue that bankruptcy courts should be allowed to resolve certain types
of post-confirmation tax liabilities, in the interests of fairness to different
types of creditors, the content of this exception should be determined
under the same standard as any other claim in bankruptcy, absent clear
legislative intent to the contrary. To allow bankruptcy courts special
powers to determine post-confirmation tax claims beyond what is the
norm for other creditors would be inconsistent.
This desired rationality is not just a matter of internal consistency.
Conformity with the broader working of the bankruptcy code may serve
as an indicator of whether our interpretation of § 505 is in line with the
intentions of its architects, whose architectonics have taken place against
the backdrop of the bankruptcy system as a whole. Insofar as the intent
of the architects of the statute is given weight, consistency with broader
bankruptcy code workings can enable us to conform with this intent.
In summary, due to the constraints imposed on determinations of
federal tax liabilities in the Declaratory Judgment Act, at stake in
answering the question of the breadth of the grant of authority to the
bankruptcy court under § 505 are several important bankruptcy and tax
policies, both substantive and structural. It is therefore important that
any workable interpretation of § 505 addresses these policy
considerations and conscientiously balances them.

66. See supra Part II.
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IV. CURRENT TREATMENT OF POST-CONFIRMATION TAx MATTERS BY
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

A glance at bankruptcy court decisions reveals that the analyses of
bankruptcy courts of their own authority to decide various types of tax
liabilities - particularly post confirmation tax matters - under a § 505
analysis have not been uniform, both in terms of the content of court
analyses and the holdings in various cases.67 Although the tripartite
division into pre-petition, "gap," and post-confirmation liabilities is an
important feature of the bankruptcy system, courts have not in fact gone
about determining whether or not to hear a case based on a direct
analysis of the timeframe in which it arises. They have turned instead to
the statutory and constitutional provisions surrounding § 505 in order to
determine its proper scope.68 The two main jurisdictional requirements
that have been considered by courts are: (1) the requirement that in order
for the bankruptcy judge to hear the matter, it must be a "core
proceeding" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b); and (2) the requirement that the
actual case or controversy requirements contained in the United States
Constitution and reiterated in the Declaratory Judgment Act are met.69
In general, cases that come before the courts pre-confirmation tend to
raise questions pertaining to whether or not the actual case or
controversy requirements of the U.S. Constitution and the Declaratory
Judgment Act are satisfied. In contrast, cases before the courts after the
plan has been confirmed tend to focus on whether the matter is a core
proceeding. 70 This observation is in accordance with the dictates of
common sense: if a tax liability that arises post-confirmation is before
the court prior to confirmation of the plan, it is likely that the events
surrounding it may not have occurred yet, or that a case between the
taxing authority and the debtor has not been filed, hence raising case or
controversy concerns. On the other hand, if the same issue does not
come before the court until the plan has been confirmed, there are
legitimate concerns about whether or not there is sufficient relationship
between the post-confirmation tax matter and the "core" of the
bankruptcy proceeding, as well as about whether or not asserting
67. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
68. In some cases, the attention paid by courts to § 505 is quite scarce. See, e.g., In re
Antonelli, 1992 WL 435879 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2003); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)
(2003).
70. See, e.g., In re Antonelli, 1992 WL 435879 (discussing actual case or controversy
requirement). But see In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 106 B.R. 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing
core proceeding requirement).
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jurisdiction over such cases may lead to perpetual jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court over the affairs of the reorganized debtor, justified on
pragmatic grounds.
This section takes a closer look at the ways in which courts have
undertaken their analyses of the "core proceeding" and the "actual case
or controversy" requirements in determining whether or not § 505 may
apply and points to problematic features of how courts have proceeded.
A. Core Proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b) provides:
Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and
all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under
title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter
appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158
of this title [relating to appeals].71
Bankruptcy judges may also hear proceedings that - though not
"core" - are "otherwise related to a case under title 11" under 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(c). 72 In such proceedings, the bankruptcy judge may only submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for
de novo review and may not enter final orders or judgments.73 Thus, in
effect, for bankruptcy judges to enter a final order or judgment on a
matter, the matter has to be a "core proceeding" arising under title 11 or
arising in a case under title 11.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) includes a list of examples of core
proceedings, the statute states that the list contains only examples and is
not exclusive.74 Because the term "core proceeding" is not defined by
statute, bankruptcy courts are left to determine - drawing from examples
listed in (b)(2) - whether a given matter is a "core proceeding."
Furthermore, the exact relationship between § 505 and the jurisdictional
provisions of Title 28 is unclear, since 11 U.S.C. § 505 was enacted
before 28 U.S.C. § 157.75 These circumstances have led to a lack of
71. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2003). 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) provides that "[e]ach district court may
provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title II or arising
in or related to a case under title II shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
73. Id.

74. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). Collier groups the fifteen examples listed into four categories: (1)
matters of administration; (2) avoiding actions; (3) matters concerning property of the estate; and
(4) others. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.02[3] (Lawrence King, ed., 15th ed. rev. 2003).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 505 was enacted in the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, while 28 U.S.C. § 157
was enacted in 1984 as part of the Amendments Act. In re Goldblatt Brothers, 106 B.R. at 526,
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uniformity in court analyses of what constitutes a "core proceeding. 7 6
One case in which the court engaged in a "core proceedings"
analysis in interpreting the reach of § 505 was In re Gordon Sel-Way. 7
The case involved a Chapter 11 debtor seeking to compel turnover of a
tax refund against which the federal government claimed the right to
setoff, under § 505.78 Sel-Way had filed its Chapter 11 petition on July
1, 1988, and a plan was confirmed in 1991. 79 Sel-Way had confirmed a
plan in which the IRS's unsecured claim for unemployment tax penalties
was to receive a 20% payout. However, due to ongoing litigation, all
proceeds were paid to the other unsecured creditors and the IRS claim
was never paid.
When Debtor's federal employment (FUTA)
overpayment in question arose after the plan had been confirmed, the
government claimed a right to setoff. The bankruptcy court held that the
refund arose post-petition and could not be offset against a pre-petition
tax debt.81 However, the district court reversed, stating that the plan of
reorganization converted the government's unsecured claim into a postpetition obligation (since it was not discharged but grouped with other
claimants) and that the government was entitled to a 20% payout on its
claim. 82 The court held that because both
debts were post-petition, there
83
offset.
permit
to
mutuality
was requisite
The jurisdictional issues that were raised in Gordon Sel- Way were
representative of the treatment of the issue of "core proceedings" often
found in cases before the court after the plan has been confirmed. The
government argued that the claim was not a "core proceeding" because
the debtor's right to refund did not arise until after the plan had been
confirmed.84 The government also argued that the bankruptcy court
lacked "related to" jurisdiction because the estate was terminated as of
the moment of confirmation, and only the estate was authorized to seek a

discusses this problem. See infra pp. 31-35.
76. See, e.g., COLLIER, supra note 74, at 3.02[2] ("The battleground has been and will
continue to be over the relationship among 'core proceedings,' civil proceedings that are not 'core
proceedings,' and civil proceedings.., that are not within the bankruptcy jurisdiction granted by §
1334 [granting original jurisdiction to the federal district courts] at all.").
77. See In re Gordon SeI-Way, Inc., 239 B.R. 741 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
78. Id. at 744.
79. Id. at 743.
80. Id. The tax penalties were for the years 1987-1990. Id.
81. Id. at 744.
82. Id. at 751. Whether the court's analysis that the claim became a post-petition obligation is
accurate is another question. See infra pp. 43.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 746.
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tax refund under the Bankruptcy Code.8 5 The government contended
that once the estate terminates, the debtor is required to bring his suit in
the district court of the Court of Federal Claims.86
In holding that Sel-Way's claim was a core proceeding over which
the government had jurisdiction, the district court noted that § 157(b)(2),
which lists non-exclusive examples of core proceedings, includes
"proceedings impacting liquidation of the estate's assets or adjustment
of the debtor-creditor... relationship., 87 The court then stated:
In order for jurisdiction to exist under § 157 after a plan has been
confirmed, 11 U.S.C. § 1142 requires that the relief sought is
'necessary for the consummation of the plan.' Because the FUTA
refund is necessary for Sel-Way to fund its reorganization Plan, the
court finds
the requirement of § 1142 has been met and jurisdiction
88
exists.

Hence, although the court related the analysis to the examples in §
157(b)(2), the court in effect decided the question of whether Sel-Way's
claim was a core proceeding by asking whether or not it met the test in §
1142 of being "necessary for consummation of the plan., 89 This impactbased test used in Gordon Sel-Way does not mirror the intent behind the
core proceedings concept, the analysis of which should center around
whether or not the case was "arising under" or "arising in" a Title 11
case. These are concepts concerned with the nature of the proceeding;
that is, whether the cause of action is created by Title 11 or are otherwise
"arising in," rather than its impact on the reorganization's success. 90
Though the question of "core proceeding" is jurisdictional in nature, the
use of § 1142 in determining that issue reflects the infiltration of broader
policy concerns in determining the narrow jurisdictional issue. It is not
the contention of this paper that § 1142 should never be used in
determining whether the court has jurisdiction to hear a postconfirmation claim. Rather, this paper argues that its application should
be independent of the core proceeding analysis, which should be treated
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 747 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(O) (2003)).
Id. (citing II U.S.C. § 1142 (2003)).

89.

11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (2000).

90. See, e.g., COLLIER, supra note 74, at 3.02[2] (stating that "[c]ore proceedings are, at
most, those that arise in Title II cases or arise under Title II" and defining proceedings "arising
under" Title II as those in which the case of action is created by Title 11 and those "arising in"
Title II as those in which the cause of action is not created by Title I I but which could also not
have been "subject to a lawsuit absent the filing of the bankruptcy case"). This analysis focuses on
the nature of the proceeding and not its impact.
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as a separate and distinct question.
A key problem with employing a Title 28 "core proceedings"
analysis in interpreting the scope of § 505 is that implicit in such an
analysis is a conception of a complex relationship between § 505 and §
157 that necessarily presupposes an understanding of § 505 as inherently
jurisdictional rather than substantive. This problem comes to light in In
re Goldblatt Brothers.91 In Goldblatt, the Creditors' Deposit Account
(CDA) was created following plan confirmation, pursuant to debtor's
plan of reorganization, out of which administrative claims, priority
claims, and pro-rata general unsecured claims were to be paid.92 The
CDA was to be administered by a committee of unsecured creditors.93
Some years after confirmation, the committee filed a complaint against
the IRS and the Illinois Department of Revenue, seeking declaratory
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 11 U.S.C. § 505 that it was not
responsible for paying federal and state income tax on interest earned on
money in the CDA, or for filing state income tax returns related to the
fund. 94 The IRS and Department of Revenue moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that § 505(a)(1) allowed the bankruptcy court to
determine only the tax liability of debtors, and that since the Committee
and CDA were not debtors, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
under § 505(a)(1). 95
In examining the jurisdictional question, the court stated that § 505
should not be read in isolation from general jurisdictional provisions,
and posited the following relationship between § 505 of the Bankruptcy
Code and 28 U.S.C. § 157:
[I]n the absence of any provision expressly excluding federal and state
income taxation from the adjudicative power of bankruptcy courts,
determination of whether a bankruptcy court can adjudicate tax issues
would be evaluated under § 157 standards like any other jurisdiction
issue. If the tax dispute involved a core controversy,
then a bankruptcy
96
court could enter final enforceable orders.
In positing thus, the court rejected the argument implicit in the

91. In re Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 106 B.R. 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
92. Id. at 523.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 525. Elsewhere, the court states that "[ulnder the Court's holding today, the
parameters of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of federal and state income
taxation under II U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) corresponds with general principles governing a bankruptcy
court's power to adjudicate at least core matters under 28 U.S.C. § 157." Id. at 529.
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government's position that the specific jurisdiction of § 505 over tax
issues limits the more general jurisdiction allowed by § 157. 97 The court
reasoned that absent clear congressional intent to the contrary,
the jurisdictional grant over this specific substantive area of law must
be read to correspond with the general rules governing the adjudicative
powers of bankruptcy court. Otherwise § 505(a)(1)'s very broad
to
language would actually vest less authority in a bankruptcy court
98
adjudicate tax matters than would otherwise exist in its absence.
These statements by the court demonstrate a clear reading or usage
of § 505 as a provision concerned with reach rather than content. It is of
note that this reading of § 505 requires specifying the relationship
between § 505 and the jurisdictional provisions of Title 28, which is no
easy task. In Goldblatt, the court determined this relationship by
However, since the
interpreting both provisions as co-extensive.
Declaratory Judgment Act explicitly circumscribes the declaration of
federal tax liabilities to be narrower than it would otherwise be under
other general bankruptcy provisions, it is unclear whether the Act in fact
intended the court's power under § 505 to be coextensive.
The court went on to conclude that the tax issue was in fact a core
proceeding. 99 The court first cited some of the examples in § 157(b)(2)
- "matters concerning the administration of the estate, allowance 0or0
disallowance of claims against the estate, and confirmations of plans."'
The court then stated:
The CDA account was created as an integral part of the Debtor's
confirmed plan. Entrustment of the CDA and assignment of the claims
review function to the Committee clearly expedited the Debtor's
reorganization and emergence from Chapter 11. The CDA provided a
vehicle through which the process of allowing and disallowing claims
could be conducted efficiently ....These functions are at the heart of
the bankruptcy process. Further, the CDA's existence is inextricably
tied to the reorganization effort; when the processing and distribution
of claims are completed, the CDA will be closed. There is no question
that this court retained jurisdiction to resolve contested claims against
the CDA even though Debtor's duties were discharged after it funded
the account ....

97.
between
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 528. It is worth mentioning that the court notes that positing this relationship
§ 505 and § 157 does not mean § 505 is superfluous.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 526.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (L) (2000)).
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Income on funds held in the CDA has been earned post confirmation
while administration of the CDA has been under jurisdiction of this
Court. The CDA was created to carry out the Plan.... It is therefore
clear that issues as to taxability of income earned on funds held in the
CDA is [sic] within this Court's core jurisdiction to administer the
estate and implement the confirmation process. 1
Using this analysis, the court concluded that 10 2the court had
jurisdiction over the CDA and the Committee's request.
Unlike the Gordon Sel- Way court, the Goldblatt court did not
invoke a § 1142 standard for determining whether jurisdiction existed,
even though the assertion of jurisdiction in Goldblatt was also arguably
"necessary for the consummation of the plan."' 0 3 Rather, it started with
a list of examples from § 157 and then attempted to bring the facts of the
case within the province of those examples. However, like the Sel-Way
court, the Goldblatt court did consider the impact of its decision on the
reorganization of the debtor.
Both the entry of impact-based
considerations into the core proceedings analysis and the lack of
uniformity in applying the core proceeding standard are of concern. In
addition, as this paper argues, the jurisdictional reading of § 505 that is
implicated when the courts use the § 157 core proceedings analysis to
limit § 505 is also misleading. A satisfactory theory of the operation of
§ 505 must address these flaws in the current approach.
B. Actual Case or Controversy
Satisfaction of the case or controversy requirement of Article J1I of
the U.S. Constitution is another key concern that manifests itself in
bankruptcy court opinions addressing jurisdiction. 104 The importance
that the case or controversy requirements be satisfied is highlighted by
the fact that the case or controversy requirement is accorded emphasis in
the Declaratory Judgment Act, which reiterates that declaratory
judgments, though possible in some cases, may only be given if there is
an actual case or controversy present.'0 5 In their examinations of this
constitutional requirement, courts have also arrived at mixed results.
For example, in In re Antonelli, the court found that it lacked
jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment that the debtor who set up a

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.at 530.
11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (2003).
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2003).
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liquidating trust was exempt from stamp or transfer tax on transfers to
and by the trust under § 1146(c), because the actual case or controversy
10 6
requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution was not yet met.
The court noted that whether an actual case or controversy existed was a
facts-and-circumstances question, a matter of degree, and that a precise
test to determine the existence of an actual case or controversy had not
been developed by the courts. 10 7 It did, however, cite a line of cases
noting that the question to be decided is "whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy
between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficiency immediacy
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."' 1 8 The
court noted:
[t]he proposed third-party transfers are not imminent as the Plan must
still be confirmed, the property transferred to the liquidating trust, and
then prospective buyers solicited and the transactions executed.
Moreover, many factors such as market conditions, financing
arrangements, and Plan objectives will inf luence
[sic] and dictate the
10 9
length of time it takes to sell these properties.
Therefore, the court held that it would be improper for it to render a
determination at this point, since such a ruling would
essentially be "an
0
advisory opinion on a hypothetical set of facts.""
Hence, the court in Antonelli focused on the time frame within
which the events would occur. Emphasizing the lack of imminence of
the events to be decided, the court determined that the requisite case or
controversy did not exist, even though the question was quite clearly one
of law under § 1146(c) that could have been decided with reasonable
certainty given the content of the proposed plan. The court even
conceded that its holding represented a triumph of substance
over form
11
and would adversely impact the debtor's reorganization. I
In In re Kilen, by contrast, the court held that there was an actual
case or controversy such that the court could decide the debtor's motion
for declaratory judgment regarding whether the debtor had responsible
person liability under I.R.C. § 6672, or the amount, if any." 2 Even
though the IRS had not filed a proof of claim, the bankruptcy court
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

In re Antonelli, 1992 WL 435879 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
Id. at*2.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at*3.
Id.
See id.
Kilen v. United States (In re Kilen), 129 BR. 538 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1991).
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allowed the debtor to file a claim on behalf of the IRS and then oppose it
himself. Like the Antonelli court, the Kilen court, citing language from
the Supreme Court's opinion in Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
National Union, noted that the existence of case or controversy was a
distinction of degree and that no precise test existed. 113 However, unlike
the Antonelli court, the Kilen court did not primarily emphasize the time
frame of the events. Rather, it first noted that "the basic element of the
case or controversy requirement is that there be individual injury" and
that "the Constitution requires 'actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.""1 4 The court then noted
that "ripeness" was an element in the case or controversy requirement,
and that "ripeness" was to be determined under the Supreme Court's
two-part test, which considers: "(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision, and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court
consideration." ' 1 5 The court interpreted the test as follows: "This test
'assumes the existence of concrete injury' and then asks 'if the injury is
of sufficient magnitude to overcome the problems of contingency or
speculation in the decision on the merits."' 1 16 Using this test, the court
determined that the harm to Kilen was of "sufficient magnitude so as '' to
outweigh any perceived problems of speculation or contingency. 17
The standard employed by the Kilen court is in contrast to that in
Antonelli, since it emphasizes the existence of injury rather than timebased considerations of when the events arose.
The holding of the court in Kilen also stands in contrast to the
court's holding in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Goldberg (In re Hartman
Material Handling Systems, Inc.)." 8 In Allis-Chalmers, the debtor filed
in Chapter 11. The bankruptcy court had found that the principal
purpose of Allis-Chalmers' plan of reorganization was not tax avoidance
and had confirmed the plan. 19 Shortly afterward, the IRS notified the
reorganized debtor "that its future use of [net operating losses] might by
challenged under I.R.C. § 269. ' '12° In 1990, the IRS issued proposed

113. Id. at 544 (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 296 (1979)).
114. Id (quoting Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153,
157 (1983) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separationof Church

and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982))).
115. Id. (citing Abbott Lab. v. Gardner,387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)).
116. Id. (citing Nichol, supra note 114, at 175).
117. Id. at 545.
118. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Goldberg (In re Hartman Material Handling Systems, Inc.), 141
B.R.802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
119. Id.at805.
120. Id. at 807.
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regulations addressing the interaction between I.R.C. § 269, I.R.C. § 382
and 11 U.S.C. § 1129(d). 121 These regulations became final in 1992.122
The regulations stated the IRS's belief that a bankruptcy court's finding
for plan confirmation purposes that principal purpose was not tax
avoidance was not controlling for I.R.C. § 269 purposes. 123 The debtor
then requested the bankruptcy court's ruling on the retroactive
applicability of I.R.C. § 269 and its regulations to the creditors'
acquisition pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan. With regard to the question
of whether the court could determine in advance the post-confirmation
net operating loss (NOL) tax rights of the former debtor, the court held
that such determination would not be proper, because the debtor had not
yet attempted to use its NOLs. 24 The court held that since
a § 269 action had not ripened at the time of confirmation (and still has
not ripened)... any ruling would have to consider post-confirmation
events which were not even known at the time of confirmation to
determine a speculative future tax liability of the former Debtor. Such
a ruling would establish a precedent for a former debtor to return to
bankruptcy court
to have any and all of its future tax consequences
25
determined. 1

The court therefore held that it would be improper for it to
determine in advance the post-confirmation NOL tax rights of a former
debtor where the debtor had not yet attempted to use them. 126 The
attempted use of the NOLs would be the event triggering the existence
of a case or controversy.
In yet another case, the court employed a test used in the Armstrong
World Industries case, noting that in the declaratory judgment context,
the court must look at: "(i) whether there is an adversity of interest
between the IRS and the Debtors, (ii) the conclusivity that the court's
determination will have on the legal relationship between the parties,
and (iii) the practical help that results from the court's decision." 127 The
court concluded that even though the IRS had not yet attempted to assess
the debtor with liability, "it is the very fact of Schwartz's bankruptcy
case and its fresh start purpose that gives rise to an adversity of interest

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 808.
124. Id. at 812.
125. Id. at 812-13.
126. Id. at 812.
127. Schwartz v. Gardiner (In re Schwartz), 192 B.R. 90, 93 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996) (citing
Armstrong World Industries, Inc. by Wolfson v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 1992)).
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among the parties in this adversary proceeding.' 28 The court also found
requisite conclusivity and practical utility in the bankruptcy context,
since all issues relating to the bankruptcy can
be determined quickly and
129
conclusively in the bankruptcy court forum.
Hence, while the Antonelli court looked only at the timeframe in
which the prospective events were to occur, the Kilen court in effect
employed a balancing test, balancing the injury to the debtor with the
decree of speculation in making the decision. Schwartz looked for
adversity of interests and conclusivity, and concluded that both of these
requirements were met irrespective of what other policy concerns were
implicated. These represent three different approaches that bankruptcy
courts have taken in determining whether actual case or controversy
exists so as to allow it to decide a matter pre-confirmation, when the
events to be decided may not have occurred yet. Allis-Chalmers, a case
occurring post-confirmation, required the actual attempted use of the
NOLs by the debtor and found case or controversy to be lacking, since
the debtor had not yet tried to use its NOLs. That the standards
employed in the above cases have not been consistent is problematic.
Furthermore, the use of actual case or controversy jurisprudence to
restrict the use of § 505 by courts is especially difficult in the bankruptcy
context. A fundamental characteristic of the United States bankruptcy
system is the ability to bring together claims such that they can be heard
in one common forum, hence preserving the fresh start of the debtor or
the continuation of the corporate debtor as a going concern. 3 ° This
feature is exemplified in the treatment of environmental claims and mass
torts in bankruptcy proceedings. In some cases, bankruptcy has the
power to accelerate such claims, for instance, by setting up a trust out of
which future claimants who may not yet exist are to be paid. 3 '
Accelerating such claims that may be presently unmatured or contingent
not only protects the fresh start of the debtor corporation, but also serves
the purpose of ensuring a more equitable allocation of assets between

128. Id. at 94.
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101 (5)(A) (2003) (defining "claim" broadly to mean "right to
payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured"); 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (2003) (filing of bankruptcy petition operates as automatic stay on all actions to
collect, perfect or enforce any claims or liens); § 541(a) (2003) (creating a bankruptcy estate
comprised of a listed types of property, "wherever located and by whomever held", upon
commencement of a bankruptcy case); § 1141(d)(l) (2003) (stating that confirmation of plan of
reorganization discharges any debt arising before the date of confirmation).
131. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
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presently ripe claims and future claims that, though arising pre-petition,
are not yet ripe. 132 Some critics have characterized this feature of the
bankruptcy system as ignoring the case or controversy requirement in
Article III and as, therefore, unconstitutional. 33 However, it is far from
clear that the Bankruptcy Code actually operates in the absence of a case
or controversy. Several courts have recognized that the existence of a
case or controversy is a matter of degree, and that courts may well
probably hear a case if all liability-creating acts have already occurred,
and perhaps even in the face of future contingencies. 134 In either case,
the point remains: treatment of pre-petition claims within the confines of
the bankruptcy is a permitted function of a bankruptcy court, even in
cases where suit has not yet been brought by certain parties in interest,
who may not yet be identifiable or even known to exist.
Rather than applying the case or controversy requirement as the
limiting factor in allowing them to resolve such environmental or mass
tort claims, bankruptcy courts in this arena have instead focused on the
The critical factor in
time period in which the claim "arises."
determining whether the court may hear a matter is the time period in
which the conduct giving rise to the debtor's liability occurred. Several
courts have held with respect to environmental claims and mass torts
that whether or not actual symptoms have manifested themselves, or
whether there is actual ripeness, the "claim" itself arises at the time of
132. See, e.g., Alan Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening
Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2055 (2000).
An important goal in resolving mass tort liability that affects future claimants is assuring
that present tort claimants with manifested injuries and causes of action do no exhaust
the defendant's assets before future claimants manifest injuries .... The Bankruptcy
Code, with its provisions or acceleration, estimation, and classification of claims that
have not yet ripened into matured causes of action, provides an appropriate framework
for dealing with these problems.

Id.
133. See, e.g., Ralph E. Avery, Article II1and Title 11: A ConstitutionalCollision, 12 BANKR.
DEV. J. 397 (1996).
134. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202,
203 (1958). See also IOB CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3D § 2757 (1998).
There is little difficulty in finding an actual controversy if all of the acts that are alleged
to create liability already have occurred .... It is clear that in some instances a
declaratory judgment is proper even though there are future contingencies that will
determine whether a controversy ever actually becomes real .... courts also have not
hesitated to issue a declaration if "one or both parties have taken steps or pursued a
course of conduct which will result in "imminent" and "inevitable" litigation, provided
the issue is not settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration.
Id. (citing Bruhn v. STP Corporation, 312 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D.C. Colo. 1970) (quoting
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, 57 (2d. ed. 1941))).
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the conduct that resulted in the liability. 135 Hence, if the conduct leading
to the liability occurred pre-petition, the court would have jurisdiction to
hear it, whether or not the symptoms themselves appeared only after the
bankruptcy petition.
The treatment of environmental and mass torts claims in the
bankruptcy system illustrates a key feature of the bankruptcy system; as
long as the conduct out of which a claim arises occurred before the
petition was filed, the bankruptcy court has the ability to bring together
such claims and resolve them in the bankruptcy. As long as a prepetition "hook" exists for the claim, the absence of what may
conventionally be regarded as case or controversy or "ripeness" has not
proven to be an insurmountable barrier to a streamlined resolution of
such claims within the confines of the bankruptcy system. In the
bankruptcy tax context, focusing on the lack of conventional case or
controversy, rather than on the time periods in which the tax matter
arises would be fundamentally inconsistent with the treatment of future
claims elsewhere in bankruptcy law.
C. Problems with the CurrentApproach
The foregoing analysis provides examples of how courts have used
a "core proceedings" and an "actual case or controversy" analysis in
determining whether a determination of tax liabilities falls within their
jurisdiction. As these cases demonstrate, these approaches have resulted
in inconsistency, both in terms of differing standards being used in
making the determination and also in terms of inconsistency with other
parts of bankruptcy law.
Apart from these inconsistencies, however, the courts in these cases
have also failed to make analytically precise distinctions between prepetition, "gap," and post-confirmation claims. For instance, in Gordon
Sel- Way, the court treats as post-petition a refund that, though dealt with
only after the plan had been confirmed, arose with respect to pre-petition
tax years. 136 With regard to the pre-petition tax years, such a refund is

135. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991) (holding that environmental
claim arose at the time of the debtor's conduct and was hence pre-petition and dischargeable) The
court cited for support In re A.H. Robins, 63 B.R. 986, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (noting that
claim arose "at the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were performed") (quoting
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)). See generally WARREN &
WESTBROOK, supra note 9, at 756-789 (discussing the treatment of environmental and mass torts
claims in bankruptcy).
136. In re Gordon Sel-Way, 239 B.R. 741 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999).
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more accurately considered a pre-petition refund. 137 This lack of an
analytical "bright line," together with the inconsistent and varying
standards for determining what constitutes a "core proceeding" or where
an actual case or controversy is present, may open the door to limitless
jurisdiction on the part of the bankruptcy court, motivated by impactbased rather than formal concerns. 138 This inconsistency places the
integrity of the bankruptcy system as a whole at risk.
It is not the contention of this paper that the jurisdictional
provisions of Title 28 and the requirements of the United States
Constitution be ignored. On the contrary, even determinations of prepetition and "gap" liabilities under § 505 should be subject to these
general jurisdictional requirements. However, due to the lack of
certainty in regard to what constitutes a core proceeding and of what is
required in order for an actual case or controversy to exist, a more
realizable limiting principle on the reach of § 505 is required in addition
to the work being performed by these general jurisdictional principles,
especially where the liability at issue is not a typical pre-petition or
"gap" claim. The absence of this principle has resulted in a fuzzy line
between what liabilities a bankruptcy court may or may not determine.
The likelihood of this line being crossed and jurisdiction being illicitly
expanded is high in a situation where the result may have a significant
practical impact on the success or failure of a plan of reorganization.
V.

A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE REACH OF

§

505

An analysis of current bankruptcy court approaches reveals that in
deciding the extent of their jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts do not
consider the applicability of § 505 based on whether the tax matter
before them is a pre-petition, "gap," or post-confirmation matter.
Furthermore, many courts do not consider the limits of § 505 at all,
relying instead on other statutory and constitutional provisions to set
limits on jurisdiction. As the preceding section demonstrates, such an
approach yields analyses that are uneven across cases, inconsistent with

137. See supranotes 18-19 and accompanying text.
138. See also The Effect of Confirmation of a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization: The Effect of
Confirmation on the Federal Court's ContinuingBankruptcy Jurisdiction,BANKR. L. LETTER, Jan.
2002, at 8, 9 (arguing that a problem with the in rem approach implicit in the Pacor functional test to
determining "related to" jurisdiction is that it "roams in the direction of perpetual federal
jurisdiction" and advocating an in personam approach that distinguishes the bankruptcy estate from
the reorganized debtor that emerges after bankruptcy and limits jurisdiction over the latter); Ralph
Brubaker, One Hundred Years of FederalBankruptcy Law and Still Clinging to an In Rem Model of
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 261 (1999).
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other aspects of the bankruptcy code and system, and ultimately faulty in
their understanding of the meaning and function of § 505. In light of the
shortcomings of the current approach, this paper proposes a different
reading of § 505 that enunciates limitations on the jurisdiction conferred
by that section derived from an examination of § 505 itself. Such a
reading is motivated by two concerns.
First, in order to be consistent with the fundamental nature of the
bankruptcy process, a stronger interpretive distinction should be made
based on the time period - pre-petition, gap or post-confirmation - in
which the tax liability arises. Unfortunately, such a distinction has thus
far not been strongly noted in the case law.' 39 This is despite the fact
that a key feature of the bankruptcy process is that bankruptcy creates a
bright line temporal divide between pre-petition claims. 140
The
existence of this bright line distinction in the bankruptcy system must be
kept in mind in determining the reach of § 505. Second, in order to
eliminate the shortcomings of an analysis that focuses on external
constitutional and statutory provisions in interpreting the scope of § 505,
it is essential to place more emphasis on the content of § 505 itself.
In the light of these dual concerns, an analysis focused on § 505
itself reveals three key reasons why this section should be applied only
to pre-petition and administrative claims. First, the overall organization
of Title 11 and the placement of § 505 within the Bankruptcy Code in
the Chapter and Subpart addressing creditors and claims suggests that §
505 was only meant to apply to pre-petition and gap claims. Second, the
legislative history of the section supports this argument. Third, such an
approach would be the most consistent with the overall operation of the
bankruptcy system.
A. The Organizationof Title 11 and the Placementof§ 505 Within
The Bankruptcy Code is organized by Chapters, each of which
addresses a particular aspect of bankruptcy. For instance, Chapter I
contains "General Provisions," such as definitions, rules of construction,
139. See generally supra Part IV.
140. See, e.g., WARREN & WESTBROOK, supranote 9, at 755.
Timing matters in bankruptcy because the heart of the system is the sharp cleavage
separating the debtor's pre-filing past and the debtor's post-filing future. Pre-filing
creditors are grouped together for a collective resolution of the claims against the debtor.
Post-filing creditors are creditors of the new estate and, when the estate is closed, of the
emergent debtor. Those post-filing claims are fully enforceable against the estate and the
post-bankruptcy debtor, unlike the pre-filing claims that may be entitled to only pro rata
distributions.
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and waivers of sovereign immunity with reference to particular
sections. 41 Chapter 3 deals with "Case Administration" and Chapter 5
addresses the handling of claims and their distribution, discharge and the
avoiding powers of the trustee in bankruptcy in regard to property of the
estate. 142 The placement of a particular section within a particular
Chapter, therefore, is informative as to what the section is attempting to
address. For example, § 1146, "Special Tax Provisions" must be
understood as pertaining to143special tax provisions only with regard to
Chapter 11 reorganizations.
Likewise, given the organization of the Bankruptcy Code, the
placement of § 505 provides important information about the purposes
and intended reach of the section. Section 505 falls within Subchapter 44I
of Chapter 5, which is entitled "Creditors, the Debtor, and the Estate."'
Subchapter I pertains to "Creditors and Claims."'' 45 For instance, § 501
applies to "Filing of Proofs of Claims or Interests" and addresses, among
other things, the process by which the creditor - or the debtor on the
creditor's behalf- may file a proof of claim. 146 Section 502 speaks to
allowance of claims and the claims objection process. 147 Section 503
addresses the allowance of administrative expenses, which are post148
petition claims that accrue during the period of estate administration.
Section 506 addresses the determination of secured status and treatment
of secured claims,
and § 507 deals with the treatment of priorities in
149
bankruptcy.
Subpart I of Chapter 5 is a crucial instrumentality in defining the
way in which claims are handled in the bankruptcy process. The broad
definition of "claim" in § 101 serves an important function in this
regard. 150 Upon filing the bankruptcy petition, both a wide-reaching
automatic stay is in effect and a bankruptcy estate is created.'15 The
creditors can no longer pursue the rights and processes available to them
141. 11 U.S.C. ch. 1 (2003). Note that there are no even-numbered chapters in Title 11 with
the exception of Chapter 12, which addresses the bankruptcy of family farmers.
142. Id. at chs. 3, 5.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1146 (2003).
144. 11 U.S.C. ch. 5.
145. 11 U.S.C. ch. 5, subch. I.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2003).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2003).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2003).
149. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 507 (2003).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 10 1(5) (2003) (defining "claim" broadly to mean "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured").
151. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 541 (2003).
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under state law before the bankruptcy and must instead bring "claims"
against the bankruptcy estate, which are handled in the single
bankruptcy forum.152 Thus, the filing of the bankruptcy petition in effect
serves to bring "claims" that were previously owed to the prebankruptcy debtor and dealt with under state law (such as Article 9 or
real estate common law) into the thrall of the federal bankruptcy law.
These claims are claimable only against the bankruptcy estate, whether
or not they are "reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured or unsecured."'153 Upon the discharge of a bankruptcy case which, in Chapter 11, occurs upon confirmation of the plan - the estate
ceases to exist; therefore liabilities arising after confirmation cannot be
claims against the estate. 154
The placement of § 505, titled "Determination of Tax Liability," in
the same Subpart and Chapter as the sections pertaining to how creditors
and their claims are dealt with in the bankruptcy proceeding is
instructive as to the purposes and reach of § 505. The importance of the
placement of § 505 has been noted in In re Wolverine Radio, in which
the court noted that the placement of § 505 within the Bankruptcy Code
is instructive as to its limitations, stating:
Given the legislative history of section 505 and its placement in a
chapter of the Bankruptcy Code denoted "Creditors, the Debtor and the
Estate," section 505 is not applicable where the court is not dealing
with the interrelationship and effect of creditors and their claims on the
bankrupt debtor. 155
Since obligations that arise after a Chapter 11 confirmation - or
after a discharge in bankruptcies under other chapters - are by definition
not claimable against the estate, the Wolverine court's statement in effect
implies that § 505(a) is inapplicable to post-confirmation claims.
Even supposing the Wolverine court was correct in its analysis of
the applicability of § 505, the question remains as to why the language
of § 505 is so broad if it only was meant to apply to pre-petition and
"gap" claims. Indeed, one might ask, if § 505 was only supposed to
address "claims" like any other claims, why was there a need for § 505
at all? This objection has particular credence since the authority of the
bankruptcy court to determine the amounts of disputed claims is
152. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502 (2003).
153. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2003).
154. Seeid § 1141(b) (2003).
155. In re Wolverine Radio 930 F.2d 1132, 1140 (6th Cir. 1991).
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unequivocally granted under § 502(b). 15 6
The answer to this question lies in the special nature of the IRS as a
creditor of the bankruptcy estate. While most of the creditors in a
bankruptcy would have been able to pursue their claims at state law if
the bankruptcy petition had not been filed, this is not the case in regard
to federal tax liabilities of the debtor. The backdrop against which the
bankruptcy takes place is not one of state law but is rather one offederal
tax law. The creditor in this case is a federal governmental entity with
its own system of courts and its own Code governing taxation. 157 Absent
the bankruptcy, the IRS would have been left to pursue its claims in the
tax courts (or federal district courts) under federal tax law. In light of
the special nature of the creditor in the tax context, the presence and
function of § 505 in Chapter 5 Subpart becomes clear. The bankruptcy
courts may determine the amounts of other disputed claims, though
previously handled in state court.1 58 Equally, § 505 emphasizes that the
bankruptcy courts are authorized to determine the amount of taxes or
penalties relating to taxes that would otherwise have been adjudicated in
the federal tax courts or district courts. In effect, § 505 makes it clear
that the special nature of the tax claims creditor as a federal entity does
not prevent such claims from being dealt with by bankruptcy courts in
the bankruptcy system in the same manner as other claims and creditors
who, before the bankruptcy, were subject to state law. 159 In the same
way that bankruptcy brings in claims that would otherwise have been
determined under state law and allows bankruptcy courts to determine
their amounts, tax claims that would otherwise have been brought in tax
court are also covered by the bankruptcy and determinable by the
bankruptcy courts.
Underlying this reading of § 505 is a different understanding of the

156.
157.

See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2003).
See generally I.R.C. § 1 et seq. (2003).

See also LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH

WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 95-96 (4th ed. 2003).

Reference to "the Code" sometimes offers an opportunity for friendly competition
among commercial lawyers as to the identity of the true bearer of the title "the Code."
Tax mavens refer to the Internal Revenue Code as "the Code," commercial law
generalists refer to the U.C.C. as "the Code," and debtor-creditor specialists refer to the
federal bankruptcy statute as "the
jokes that no one seems inclined
humor.
Id. For further reading regarding the
Toward a Theory of Bankruptcy Tax:

Code." The whole area is such a barren ground for
to fix the problem and remove this tiny source of
analytics of statutory coordination, see Frances R. Hill,
A Statutory CoordinationApproach, 50 TAX LAW. 103

(1996).
158.

See II U.S.C. § 502 (2003).

159.

See 11 U.S.C. § 505 (2003).
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nature of § 505. As mentioned previously, the approaches taken by the
courts in In re Gordon Sel- Way and In re Goldblatt presume a reading of
§ 505 as a provision that specifies the breadth of the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction. 160 Under this paper's interpretation of § 505, the section is
more accurately characterized as a substantive provision, that is, one that
specifies the content of the bankruptcy court's authority concerning a
special type of bankruptcy claim. That the code sections surrounding §
505 are also substantive provisions that contain information as to what
the bankruptcy court can and cannot do with regard to claims in the
bankruptcy proceeding suggest that this interpretation is correct.
That the nature of § 505 as a substantive rather than a jurisdictional
provision that should be understood in the context of its placement in the
Code was noted by the Third Circuit in Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v.
IRS, a case in which the court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to
determine the tax liability of the principal of the debtor accounting
firm.161 In determining that § 505 did not control the issue, but rather
merely served to deny bankruptcy court jurisdiction over a case that had
previously been adjudicated, the court stated:
Although appellant... correctly asserts that the language of the
section does not expressly limit its application to debtors, Congress'
intent clearly was not to create another tax court, and thus the meaning
of Section 505 must be determined from the statute as a whole ....

This section is contained in a subchapter denoted "Creditors and
Claims" which is in a chapter of the bankruptcy code denoted,
"Creditors, the Debtor, and the Estate." This context highlights the
limited application of Section 505. Further, the other provisions in the
subchapter deal with the interrelationship and effect of creditors and
their claims on the bankrupt debtor. Given the placement of Section
505, this would be an unusual location to insert a provision granting
broad jurisdictional powers.162
The court therefore concluded that "Section 505 was intended to clarify
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over tax claims, not limit its
jurisdiction only to debtors." 163 While the issues in Quattrone are
different from the ones addressed in this paper, the approach taken by
the Quattrone court is similar in that it is cognizant of the context in
which the provision exists and sentient of the clarification function of
the provision rather than focusing merely on its jurisdictional breadth.
160.

See supra Part IV.

161. Quattrone Accountants, Inc. v. IRS, 895 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1990).
162. Id. at 925.
163. Jd. at 924.
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In sum, § 505 has been placed in proximity with other sections of
the Bankruptcy Code that address the treatment of claims and creditors
in the bankruptcy in Subpart I of Chapter 5. These code sections are
specifically targeted at addressing "claims" against the estate in the
bankruptcy, which are by definition those debts that arise on the prepetition side of the temporal divide, regardless of when they are actually
before the court, in addition to administrative expenses incurred by the
estate during the "gap" between the filing of the petition and the
confirmation of the plan. Given the placement of § 505, we may infer
that this section, like those surrounding it, was intended to apply to
treatment of claims arising pre-petition and in the "gap," and not to postconfirmation claims, with regard to which a post-confirmation
reorganized debtor must fend for itself outside of the bankruptcy.
B. Evidence of Legislative History Considerations
The legislative history of § 505 tends to support the proposition that
§ 505 was only intended to be applied to pre-discharge tax liabilities;
that is, liabilities arising prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and
those arising during the period of administration of the estate. The
legislative history of § 505 makes no mention of § 505's applicability to
post-confirmation matters whatsoever. 164 In fact, in their comments
regarding § 505, both the House and Senate stated:
Where no proceeding in the Tax Court is pending at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, the tax authority can, under the
House amendment, file a claim against the estate for a prepetition tax
liability and may also file a request that the bankruptcy court hear
arguments and decide the merits of an individual debtor's personal
liability for the balance of any nondischargeable tax liability not
satisfied from assets of the estate ....
[W]here the tax authority does not file a claim or a request that the
bankruptcy court determine dischargeability of a specific tax liability,
the debtor could file such a request on his own behalf, so that the
bankruptcy court would then determine both the validity of the claim
against assets in the estate and165also the personal liability of the debtor
for any nondischargeable tax.

164. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 (the
section-by-section analysis of the House Report excludes any analysis of § 505 whatsoever).
165. 124 CONG. REC. HI 1,110 to 11,111 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); S17,426-17,428 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978), reprinted in 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, I 505.LH[2][a] (Lawrence King, ed. 15th
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The types of proceedings on which these comments are focused, in
conjunction with the lack of mention of post-confirmation application in
the legislative history, suggest that § 505 was intended to apply to
determinations of tax liability in conjunction with the resolution and
disputation of claims in the bankruptcy process, that is, pre-petition
liabilities. 166
Furthermore, in its general comments on Chapter 5 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, the Senate Report states that "Chapter 5
reflects the policy of the revision of the Bankruptcy Act to include all of
the property of the debtor in the bankruptcy case and to allow the trustee
more easily to recover property that may have been transferred by the
debtor.' ' 167 This comment clearly implies that the focus of Chapter 5 is
on the actions and property of the debtor prior to the bankruptcy filing
and on debts owing by the debtor as of the day of the bankruptcy filing.
Nowhere in its legislative history is Chapter 5 or its provisions
contemplated as applying to post-confirmation claims.
Because there are no allusions to the treatment of post-confirmation
tax liabilities under § 505 in the legislative history, much of what can be
taken from that history is gleaned by inference. However, the omission
of any reference to § 505's applicability to post-confirmation tax claims,
along with more general statements of the intent and policy behind the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, suggests that its drafters did not intend
application of § 505 to post-confirmation tax liabilities. While lack of
legislative intent does not completely preclude such application, it may
have important implications for the integrity of the fundamental
structure of how bankruptcy operates.
C. Consistency with Bankruptcy Policy as a Whole
Observations about the context and placement of § 505 within the
Bankruptcy Code as well as the fact that the legislative history of the
provision does not seem to have contemplated an application to postconfirmation tax liabilities are both powerful arguments in favor of
limiting jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts under § 505 to
determinations of pre-petition and post-petition pre-confirmation tax
ed. rev. 2002) (emphasis added).
166. See also QuattroneAccountants, 895 F.2d at 925 ("The legislative history of Section 505
emphasizes that it permits the bankruptcy court to determine the tax liability of a debtor 'that has
not been contested before or adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent
jurisdiction before the bankruptcy case."') (quoting S.REP. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5853).
167. S. REP. No.95-989, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5791.
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liabilities. Limiting the reach of the statute in this manner avoids a
strained reading of the statute to reach liabilities that appear outside of
its grasp.
Such a limitation is also in accord with the structure of the
Bankruptcy Code and the United States Bankruptcy System as a whole.
As discussed earlier, the clear separation of liabilities based on the time
periods in which they arise in Chapter 11 - pre-petition, "gap," or postdischarge - and the exit of the debtor from the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy system upon discharge of his bankruptcy case are key
features of the bankruptcy system.168 Limiting § 505's application to
pre-petition and "gap" liabilities is consistent with this feature of the
broader system.
The merits of such an approach do not go merely to internal
consistency and a streamlined Bankruptcy Code. By disallowing the
application of § 505 to post-confirmation tax claims in a context where
other types of post-confirmation claims are generally outside the reach
of the bankruptcy court, a differentiated treatment of tax liabilities that
may be unfair to the tax creditor and inconsistent with the treatment of
other types of claims may be eschewed.
If § 505 is read, as has been suggested, as a substantive grant of
authority to the bankruptcy courts to determine tax liability, and it is
apparent that there is no clear and unequivocal intent to differentiate the
treatment of post-confirmation federal tax claims from other types of
post-confirmation claims, then limiting § 505's reach to determinations
of pre-petition and "gap" tax liabilities provides valuable consistency
with the broader goals of bankruptcy policy and with the treatment of
other creditors. Indeed, where there has been an intent to allow
bankruptcy courts to determine post-confirmation state and local tax
matters, the legislature has shown itself perfectly capable of making this
intent explicit.' 69 Absent a similar, clear manifestation of intent in
regard to post-confirmation federal taxes, the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts should not be artificially expanded by taking a literalist approach
to § 505(a).
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE MODEL: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE

Under the above analysis, § 505 is understood to allow bankruptcy
168. See supra Part II.
169. See 11 U.S.C. § l146(d) (2003) (providing a procedure for a proponent of a plan of
reorganization to request bankruptcy court determination of state or local tax effects of the plan).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

41

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 19 [2004], Art. 3

AKRON LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 19

courts to determine only pre-petition claims and liabilities of the
bankruptcy estate accrued during its administration. Post-confirmation
tax liabilities, such as determinations of consequences of plans of
reorganization, are beyond the jurisdiction conferred to the bankruptcy
courts by § 505. In light of the important policy considerations
discussed in Part III, it is important in evaluating this interpretation of §
505 to determine what exactly the policy effects are of this narrower
reading of § 505's jurisdiction. Such an evaluation reveals that although
the reading of § 505 proposed by this paper will cut back on the ability
of bankruptcy courts to determine certain post-confirmation tax
liabilities, the types of cases that will actually be affected are actually
smaller in number than commentators would suppose. The gains made
both in terms of the application of a consistent legal standard and also in
terms of consistency with the Bankruptcy Code and system as a whole
far outweigh the reductions in jurisdiction entailed by this proposal.
There are two major reasons why the reduction of jurisdiction
implied by this model is less serious than one might think on first
glance.
First, the clear delineation of what constitutes a postconfirmation liability greatly constrains the types of cases that are
actually legitimately post-confirmation liabilities. Second, although on
the surface it appears that the Declaratory Judgment Act constitutes a
total prohibition on courts' ability to determine and post-confirmation
federal tax matter outside of § 505, cases from outside the bankruptcy
context suggest that the reach of the Act may not be as total as is
supposed.
A. The Reduction in Scope of what Constitutes a Post-ConfirmationTax
Liability
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that once "postconfirmation matters" are accurately understood as those that actually
"arise" after plan confirmation, the number of cases that might
previously have been considered post-confirmation tax liabilities
decreases dramatically. For example, "hybrid" tax issues that stem from
pre-petition conduct, but traverse the gap and remain "alive" after the
confirmation should properly be classified as pre-petition tax liabilities.
These "hybrid" issues may therefore, at the request of the debtor or the
creditor, be properly decided under § 505. This implies that as long as
other general jurisdictional provisions (such as those in Title 28) are met,
cases such as In re Schwartz and In re Kilen, in which debtor's made a
pre-confirmation request for determination of their I.R.C. § 6672
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responsible person liability and the courts decided the issue, may be
decided under § 505, since the events upon which such liability would
be based occurred pre-petition. 170 Though such cases are sometimes
cited as examples in favor of courts' broad jurisdiction in making
determinations of post-confirmation tax consequences,' 7 1 these cases are
actually fundamentally different from cases in which the liability to be
determined is a post-confirmation question. Requests for determination
of responsible person liability that has not yet been assessed may be
considered claims arising pre-petition that may be decided using § 505,
because the conduct took place before the bankruptcy petition was
filed. 172 As noted, the fact that the penalty is exempt from discharge
does not stop the debtor from seeking a determination of the liability in
the context of the bankruptcy plan as part of the claims process. 173 This
is consistent with the treatment of other claims exempt from discharge in
bankruptcy: debtors may nonetheless seek a determination of such
claims from the bankruptcy court during the bankruptcy process, even
though a creditor has not filed a claim
and even if the debt remains after
74
discharged.1
is
case
bankruptcy
the
Another genre of cases that would be considered pre-confirmation
under this analysis are those cases in which the liability is a pre-petition
tax liability but, for whatever reason, that liability ends up having to be
resolved after the plan has been confirmed and the case discharged.
These pre-petition liabilities should fall under the jurisdiction granted by
§ 505, although they may be beyond the jurisdiction of the court for
other reasons, such as res judicata, or failure to meet the general
jurisdictional requirements. For instance, in In re Van Dyke, the
liquidating agent of a trust that was created under debtor's confirmed
Chapter 11 plan sued for a refund of an alleged tax overpayment under §
505(a) after the plan had been confirmed. 175 The IRS's claim had been
estimated at the time of confirmation, and the court's opinion notes that
"the confirmed plan unmistakably contemplates that the liability for the
1987 taxes would be fixed at some future point in the bankruptcy
proceeding" and remarked that "[t]his bankruptcy case is not yet

170. See In re Schwartz, 192 B.R. 90 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996); Kilen v. United States (In re
Kilen), 129 B.R. 538 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1991).
171. See, e.g., Haber, supra note 28, at 419-20; Jacobs, supra note 28, at 998-99. But see
HENDERSON & GOLDRING, supra note 15, at § 1013.3.2.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
173. See supra text accompanying note 21.
174.

See id

175. In re Van Dyke, 275 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2002).
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The court also noted that the confirmation order had
over." 176
authorized the court to retain jurisdiction to determine disputes over the
administration of the assets of the estate, and that determination of the
amount of claims is "a primary function of bankruptcy law and is at the
core of bankruptcy administration."1 77 Under these circumstances where the plan had contemplated future modification of the plan, the
bankruptcy proceeding was still in progress (albeit "substantially
consummated"), and the plan had authorized retention of jurisdiction - it
was proper for the bankruptcy court to determine the right to a refund
under § 505. The tax matter at issue here was a pre-petition tax issue,
and that court's use of § 505 in this case was based on a claims
determination analysis. The court's analysis in Van Dyke is therefore
consistent with the analytical model presented in this paper.
On the other hand, it must be conceded that imposing a bright line
rule that § 505 does not apply to post-confirmation tax liabilities does
result in a narrowing of the kinds of cases § 505 applies to, and
reinforces the inability of the courts to hear cases concerning genuinely
post-confirmation tax issues. For instance, at first glance, the theory
implies that the application of § 505 in In re Goldblatt - another case
frequently cited as evidence that courts may determine post-confirmation
tax consequences of plans of reorganization - was improper, since the
matter in Goldblatt was a post-confirmation tax matter. 7 8 This reading
of § 505 also implies that In re Antonelli - in which the court was
requested pre-confirmation to determine the tax consequences of
establishing and operating a trust to be set up under a Chapter 11 plan,
but found that it had no jurisdiction to do so - was rightly decided, if for
the wrong reasons. 179 In Antonelli, the court held that it could not make
such a determination because the requisite case or controversy did not
exist. 18° However, the model presented by this paper suggests that the
problem in Antonelli was really that the issue the court was asked to
decide did not arise from any pre-petition event, act or occurrence. It
was therefore not properly treated under the Chapter 5, Subpart I, claims
process. If there had been a pre-petition "hook," the tenuousness of the
case or controversy requirement should not have been an impermeable
barrier to the court's exercise of jurisdiction.
176. Id. at 861-62.
177. Id.at 862.
178. However, as will be discussed, the inability to apply § 505 to Goldblatt should not prevent
the bankruptcy court from deciding that type of issue. See infra pp. 62-63.
179. In re Antonelli, 1992 WL 435879 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
180. Id.at 3.
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B. The Nature of the ProhibitionAgainst Determinationsof Federal
Taxes Under the DeclaratoryJudgment Act
As explained above, the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that
where there is an actual case or controversy and if the court has
jurisdiction, any United States court may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any "interested party" seeking such declaratory
judgment. 181 However, federal taxes are excepted from the Declaratory
Judgment Act.1 82 Proceedings under § 505 and § 1146 of the
Bankruptcy Code are exceptions to the federal tax exception. 183 It is
because of this exception and the exception to this exception that the
reach of § 505 is so significant. The widespread perception is that if §
505 is not employed in tax matters with post-confirmation dimensions
that come before the bankruptcy court, it will be impossible for
bankruptcy courts to hear such matters at all. Determining the extent to
which this is true requires a closer look at the requirements of the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
Under traditional jurisdictional principles, a court could only act
when a controversy has matured to the point where a plaintiff has a
remedy that can be imposed, such as an injunction or judgment for
damages. 84 However, in the light of the hardships imposed by
situations in which there exists an actual controversy but which are not
yet ripe for imposition of an affirmative remedy, a declaratory judgment
remedy is a useful remedy.' 85 Indeed, a leading treatise notes:
The remedy made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and Rule
57 is intended to minimize the danger of avoidable loss and the
unnecessary accrual of damages and to afford one threatened with
liability an early adjudication without waiting until an adversary
should see fit to begin an action after the damage has accrued. It
relieves potential defendants "from the Damoclean threat of impending
litigation which a harassing adversary might brandish, while initiating
suit at his leisure - or never." It permits actual controversies to be
settled before they ripen into violations of law or a breach of
contractual duty and it helps avoid a multiplicity of actions by
affording an adequate, expedient, and inexpensive means for declaring

181. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2003).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See WRIGHT, ET AL, supra note 134, at § 2751 ("Until a controversy had matured to a
point at which [complainant is entitled to remedy], and the person entitled thereto sought to invoke
it, the courts were powerless to act.").
185.

See id.
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86
in one action the rights and obligations of litigants. 1

On the other hand, while the hardships imposed in the absence of the
declaratory judgments remedy are a rationale for the existence of said
remedy, a countervailing interest of the Internal Revenue Service in the
area of tax collection has led to the provision of an exception to the
ability of courts to render declaratory judgment in the area of federal
taxes. For instance, courts have indicated "the powerful governmental
interests in protecting the administration of the tax system from
premature judicial interference" as a rationale for the Declaratory
Judgment Act federal tax exception.' 87
However, there is evidence that suggests that the Declaratory
Judgment Act may reach less widely than one might think. Courts have
noted that the Act's legislative history indicates that "the congressional
intent was to create a prohibition as to actions concerning federal taxes
coterminous with that provided in the Anti-Injunction Act so as to
preclude circumvention of the provisions of the Anti-Injunction Act
188
through the maintenance of an action seeking declaratory relief only.'
Courts have concluded that this means that "despite its broad language,
the Declaratory Judgment Act bars only declaratory relief sought 'for the
purpose of restraining the assessment of collection of any tax."" 89 It
follows that while the Act may indeed prohibit courts from deciding
whether or how much tax is due, in cases where the declaratory relief
would not result in restraining the IRS from actually collecting a tax, the
application of the Act is less certain.
In fact, cases do hold that a court may issue declaratory judgment if
the court is resolving another dispute, even if the resolution of that
dispute ultimately gives rise to tax consequences. 190 For instance, the
Declaratory Judgment Act has been held inapplicable to questions
dealing with the disposition of a tax refund.' 91 Some courts have also
186. Id. (quoting Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 237 (D.N.J.
1966)).
187. Daines v. Alcatel, S.A., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1160 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (quoting Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 747 (1974)).
188. Dominion Trust Co. v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 1321, 1323 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)
(quoting Lugo v. Smith, 453 F. Supp. 677, 690 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (citation omitted)); see also
Ecclesiastical Order of the ISM of AM, Inc. v. IRS, 725 F.2d 398, 404-05 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he
two Acts, though not similarly worded, are, as the majority notes, to be interpreted
coterminously."), quoted in Dominion Trust, 786 F. Supp. at 1323; Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. §
7421 (2003) (providing that no suit to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person).
189. Church of Scientology v. Egger, 539 F. Supp. 491,494 (D.D.C. 1982).
190.
191.

See generally WRIGHT, ET AL, supra note 134, at § 2762.
See Nelson v. Regan, 560 F. Supp 1101 (D. Conn. 1983).
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held the Act inapplicable to a case where the court was asked to declare
not whether tax was due or how much, but only the question of which of
92
two entities was liable for the otherwise unchallenged assessment.
While such distinctions may appear facile, the existence of these cases
indicates that in the bankruptcy context, declaratory judgment in cases
such as In re Goldblatt (liability as between two parties), In re Gordon
Sel- Way (refund claim) and In re Van Dyke (refund claim) would not be
prohibited under the Declaratory Judgment Act even if § 505 were not
applied. Rather, since the federal tax exception would not apply, courts
could decide - subject to constitutional and general jurisdictional
provisions - to assert jurisdiction over the post-confirmation tax matters
under Title 11 provisions other than § 505.
The foregoing analysis shows that the universe of cases to which
the limitations of the Declaratory Judgment Act would be determinative
outside of § 505 is actually quite small. Requests for determinations that
are not declaratory (i.e., those which are ripe or in which immediate
remedy can be given) would not be prevented by the Act. Even if the
judgment requested were declaratory, the Declaratory Judgment Act
would be bounded in its relationship with the Anti-Injunction Act and
would not apply to determinations of tax refunds or determinations of
which party was responsible to pay the tax. The Act also would not
apply if the court were deciding an unrelated issue that merely happened
to give rise to tax consequences.
Given the small universe of cases to which the Declaratory
Judgment Act prohibition would actually apply in the absence of § 505
as well as the aforementioned exclusions, it seems clear that the specter
of the lack of jurisdiction that could arise stemming from this paper's
reading of § 505 is not as frightening as one might imagine. The
authority and reach of other code provisions informs us that § 505 is not
the beginning and end of this debate. It is true that the reading of §
505(a) proposed by this paper would prevent the bankruptcy court from

192.

See, e.g., Henshel v. Guilden, 300 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (declaration of which of

two entities was liable for tax was not declaratory judgment "with respect to Federal Taxes" barred
by Declaratory Judgment Act); Dominion Trust Co. v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 1321 (court was
not barred from deciding case by Declaratory Judgment Act where sole issue was whether tax
should be paid out of trust assets or by defendant). But see Daines v. Alcatel, S.A., 105 F. Supp. 2d
1153, 1160-61 (E.D. Wash. 2000) (disagreeing with Henshel).
193. For example, the court could assert jurisdiction under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (providing that
"[t]he court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this title") or 11 U.S.C. § 1142 (providing that "[tihe court may direct the debtor
and any other necessary party to perform any... act, including the satisfaction of any lien, that is

necessary for the consummation of the plan").
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determining issues that amount to actual determinations of postconfirmation tax liability. However, in the light of the important federal
tax policies articulated in the Declaratory Judgment Act and the dangers
inherent in a relentless expansion of jurisdiction, it is clear that this
contraction of jurisdiction is well justified.
VII. CONCLUSION

This paper argues for the imposition of a limitation on the
jurisdiction granted by § 505 based on the time period in which the tax
liability in question arises. A close examination of § 505 in the context
of its legislative history and placement in the Bankruptcy Code shows
that § 505 is essentially a feature of the claims determination process in
bankruptcy, and as such should only be applied to determinations of tax
liabilities arising with respect to tax periods before the bankruptcy
petition is filed, as well as post-petition but pre-confirmation tax
liabilities. It is true that § 505 is not the only parameter that determines
the existence of jurisdiction to determine these claims and that more
general jurisdictional provisions must also be considered in determining
the ultimate existence of jurisdiction. However, the applicability of §
505 should not be allowed to rest solely on the scope of these broader
jurisdictional provisions, since this would lead to inconsistency and lack
of rationality in the treatment of tax claims and could lead to everexpanding jurisdiction, especially in consideration of other aspects of the
bankruptcy system. Rather, restrictions on the applicability of § 505
should be sought within the statute itself.
In support of its position, this paper also argues that the extent of
the policy losses associated with this more circumscribed interpretation
of § 505 has been overstated. Many of the matters that are often labeled
post-confirmation liabilities are more properly considered pre-petition
liabilities. Furthermore, the inapplicability of § 505 to post-confirmation
tax liabilities does not cast a lethal blow to bankruptcy court ability to
consider and decide all post-confirmation issues, assuming that
compliance with other general jurisdictional requirements are met. The
net cast by the prohibition in the Declaratory Judgment Act is wide but
not impermeable.
In conclusion, circumscribing the reach of § 505 such that it does
not become the catchphrase that allows bankruptcy courts free reign to
determine post-confirmation tax consequences may seem like an
alarming outcome to policy-oriented bankruptcy practitioners. Policy
concerns have often been cited as a reason to take a "common sense"
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approach toward the role of the bankruptcy court in commandeering the
reorganization and ensuring its success. However, it is important that
the interest in ensuring a successful reorganization does not lead to a
compromise of federal tax policies or to sloppy construction of the
statute in a way that compromises the integrity and rationality of the
bankruptcy system as a whole. Ultimately, a close look at the actual
content of the limitations placed by the Declaratory Judgment Act and
the constitutional and statutory restraints demonstrates that analytical
precision and policy efficacy need not be mutually exclusive.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004

49

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 19 [2004], Art. 3

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol19/iss1/3

50

